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(Accounting Series Release No. 78) 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Washington, D. C. 
March 25, 1957 
In the Matter of 
TOUCHE, NIVEN, BAILEY & SMART, et al. 
(Pile No. 4-77) 
(Rule II(e) - Rules of Practice) 
FINDINGS AND 
OPINION OF THE 
COMMISSION 
ACCOUNTING - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
Suspension of Privilege to Practice 
Before Commission — 
Lack of Independence by Accountant 
Failure to Comply with Accepted Accounting 
Practice 
In a proceeding under Rule II(e) of the Commission's 
Rules of Practice, where a firm of certified public 
accountants certified financial statements filed 
with the Commission which were materially misleading 
in that, among other things, the balance sheet under-
stated reserves for uncollectible accounts, over-
stated current assets, and listed as due from custom-
ers material amounts which represented advances to 
subsidiaries, and the income statement made insuf-
ficient provision for losses on uncollectible accounts, 
and the firm and two partners who participated in the 
preparation and filing of the statements improperly 
relied upon unsupported representations of management 
with respect to these matters, held, the firm and 
the partners engaged in improper professional conduct 
and their privilege to practice before the Commission 
should be suspended for 15 days. 
APPEARANCES: 
Edmund H. Worthy, for the Office of the Chief Accountant 
of the Commission. 
Eustace Seligman, Howard T. Milman, Jerome Gotkin, Bruce 
A. Hecker, and Sullivan & Cromwell, for respondents. 
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These are proceedings instituted under Rule II(e) of 
our Rules of Practice 1/ to determine whether the privilege 
of appearing or practicing before us should be denied, 
temporarily or permanently, to Touche, Niven, Bailey and 
Smart ("TN"), a partnership of certified public accountants, 
to Henry Eugene Mendes and William W. Werntz, partners in 
said partnership, and to Oscar Blomquist, an individual 
formerly employed by said partnership. 2/ 
After appropriate notice, private hearings were held. 
Respondents and the Office of the Chief Accountant of the 
Commission ("Staff") submitted proposed findings and briefs 
in support thereof, and reply briefs. The hearing examiner 
submitted a recommended decision, recommending that the 
proceedings be dismissed as to respondent Blomquist, but 
that the other respondents be denied the privilege of prac-
ticing before us for a period of 15 days. Thereafter, 
respondents filed exceptions and a brief in support thereof, 
and we heard oral argument. On the basis of an independent 
review of the record, we make the following findings and 
conclusions. 
1/ Rule II(e) provides: 
"The Commission may disqualify, and deny, 
temporarily or permanently, the privilege of 
appearing or practicing before it in any way 
to any person who is found by the Commission 
after hearing in the matter 
"(1) not to possess the requisite 
qualifications to represent others; or 
"(2) to be lacking in character or 
integrity or to have engaged in unethical 
or improper professional conduct." 
2/ Another named respondent, Carol P. Hall, who was a TN 
partner, died in December 1956. 
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The issues in these proceedings relate to TN's certi-
fication on March 19, 1948 of the financial statements of 
Seaboard Commercial Corporation ("Seaboard") which were 
included in Seaboard's annual report for its fiscal year 
ended December 31, 1947, filed with this Commission on Form 
10-K pursuant to Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The order initiating these proceedings alleges 
(l) that those financial statements were materially mislead-
ing, particularly in that the balance sheet showed an in-
adequate reserve for losses and contingencies, overstated 
current assets, and included amounts due from subsidiaries 
as amounts due from customers, and the income statement made 
insufficient provision for losses on uncollectible accounts, 
and (2) that the respondents failed to comply with generally 
accepted auditing standards and disregarded generally accepted 
accounting principles, and rules and regulations of this 
Commission. 
History and Business of Seaboard and its Major Accounts 
Seaboard 
Seaboard began business under that name in 1934 at 
which time it was engaged principally in the wholesale and 
retail automobile financing business. In 1937 a Factoring 
and Accounts Receivable Division ("Receivable Division") 
was established, for the purpose of purchasing accounts 
receivable of manufacturers and wholesalers and this became 
an increasingly important part of Seaboard's business. It 
was Seaboard's policy to keep its advances below the face 
amount of the security, the difference being termed a mar-
gin, to keep its accounts receivable portfolio in a high 
state of liquidity, with average maturities of 30 to 60 days, 
and to maintain diversification as to amounts, industries, 
and geographical location. 
In 1939, Seaboard began engaging in inventory financ-
ing as a collateral activity to its accounts receivable 
financing. After the entry of the United States into war 
in 1941, Seaboard retired entirely from the automobile 
financing field and began to finance war contracts, making 
collateralized loans, primarily against receivables, for 
working capital purposes. In 1942 Seaboard acquired owner-
ship of a manufacturing company, and thereafter during the 
war years, Seaboard's activities were concentrated princi-
pally in its accounts receivable operation, business advis-
ory service in connection with financing war production, and 
wholly-owned manufacturing companies. 
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During the war years Seaboard's advances to manu-
facturers, principally engaged in war work, were so reduced 
that Seaboard was able to retire all its debt for borrowed 
money and at December 31, 1945, its bank indebtedness was 
only $750,000. However, thereafter its borrowings increased 
substantially, and by December 31, 1947, its current lia-
bilities on notes payable to banks had reached $4,600,000. 
By the time TN began their audit at the end of 1947 
there had been a drastic change in Seaboard's condition as 
a result of a heavy concentration of Seaboard's funds in six 
companies which had experienced increasingly serious fi-
nancial difficulties in 1946 and 1947. As of December 31, 
1947, Seaboard had stated assets of $7,987,317 of which 
$5,238,855 represented advances to and investments in these 
six companies. Of the latter amount $4,107,820 consisted of 
advances by Seaboard to five manufacturing companies (and re-
lated companies), Amity Manufacturing Corporation ("Amity"), 
Bridgeport Safety Emery Wheel Company, Inc. ("Bridgeport"), 
Ripley Company, Inc. ("Ripley"), Technical Devices Corporation 
("Technical"), and Varet Knitting Mills, Inc. ("Varet"). Only 
$335,866 of the $4,107,820 represented advances against re-
ceivables, whereas $2,394,813 was against inventories, which 
are less desirable as security. Moreover, contrary to Sea-
board's practice in previous years of having average margins 
of from 16% to 35% on advances against receivables and in-
ventories, all these loans had very small margins, and some 
of the inventory loans had none. In addition to the advances 
to these five companies, as of December 31, 1947, Seaboard 
also carried an investment of $512,500 in and advances of 
$618,535 to Coastal Machine Works, Inc. ("Coastal"), a wholly-
owned manufacturing subsidiary, and about $318,000 of those 
advances were unsecured. 
These six companies received business advisory assist-
ance from Seaboard and changes of management were effected in 
an effort to improve the adverse situations encountered. 
Nevertheless these companies required increased advances, 
their margins of security decreased or disappeared, and they 
incurred operating losses during 1947. Seaboard's financial 
position as of December 31, 1947, was so closely bound up 
with that of these six companies that for a proper understand-
ing of the major questions presented in connection with TN's 
audit it is necessary to look first at the history and fi-
nancial condition of these companies. 
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Amity 
Amity's borrowing from Seaboard began in 1944 with a 
loan of $13,000 to finance its wartime production of flame 
throwers. After the successful completion of financing of 
Amity's wartime production, Seaboard undertook to finance 
Amity's peacetime activities with an initial loan of $23,000. 
Amity's efforts to produce peacetime products were never 
successful despite almost unlimited financial assistance 
from Seaboard, the assistance of the Seaboard business ad-
visory service, and changes in Amity's management instigated 
by Seaboard. Amity suffered increasing losses throughout 1946 
and 1947, and Seaboard made increasing advances. Seaboard's 
advances increased to $142,000 at May 15, 1946, to $323,000 
at October 31, 1946, to $946,000 at October 31, 1947, and to 
over $1,000,000 at December 31, 1947. For the year ended 
October 31, 1947, Amity had losses of $508,106 on sales of 
$128,369, and, despite an earlier write-up of assets on the 
basis of a reappraisal, as of October 31, 1947 it had a 
deficit of $435,477. 
Although Seaboard officials had made optimistic state-
ments in 1946 about Amity's new plans and prospects for 
profits and reduction of debt, losses by Amity and advances 
by Seaboard continued to increase. By February 4, 1948, 
Amity's debt to Seaboard had increased to $1,097,225. 3/ 
Bridgeport 
Seaboard's initial advance to Bridgeport, a company 
engaged in the manufacture of grinding wheels and machinery, 
was made in May, 1945 in the amount of $156,802. Up to this 
time Bridgeport had apparently been operating profitably and 
had a substantial net worth, 4/ Thereafter Bridgeport in-
curred continuous losses, its inventories increased to a 
point where they substantially exceeded annual sales, and 
Seaboard's advances to it increased. 
3/ For the 3 months ended January 31, 1948, Amity had sales 
of $21,641 and a loss of $131,439, and for the 6 months 
ended April 30, 1948, a loss of $249,683 was sustained on 
sales of $30,l62. Amity was declared bankrupt in October 
1948 and Seaboard realized about $40,000 on its then ad-
vances of about $1,300,000. 
4/ The terra "net worth" as used herein means the excess of 
assets over liabilities and the term "deficit" refers to 
the excess of liabilities over assets. 
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Although as early as January 1946, when Seaboard's ad-
vances to Bridgeport totalled only about $340,000, Robert P. 
Babcock, president of Seaboard, stated that Seaboard had ad-
vanced Bridgeport more than had been contemplated and Seaboard 
officials issued optimistic statements as to Bridgeport's 
prospects, its condition worsened and large additional sums 
were advanced. In 1946 fixed assets were written up about 
$197,000, following a reappraisal requested by Seaboard, and 
it was only after this write-up that Bridgeport was able to 
show a net worth of about $66,000 at the end of 1946. 
Despite substantial increases in the indebtedness to 
Seaboard, Bridgeport operated continuously on a hand-to-mouth 
basis; in July 1947 its treasurer requested that Seaboard ad-
vance $1,776 so Bridgeport's cash balance of $224 could be 
increased to $2,000. Unaudited figures for the 11 months 
ended November 30, 1947, at which time Seaboard's advances 
were $1,347,000, showed Bridgeport with a net worth of $645, 
losses for the 11 months of $74,723 on sales of $788,171, and 
an inventory of $1,068,096- Bridgeport did not have a cost 
system, efforts to install such a system having been unsuccess-
ful, and its accounting records were inadequate and unreliable. 
In October 1947 a Seaboard staff auditor had reported a 
difference of $102,000 between inventories pledged as col-
lateral as shown by Bridgeport's records and as shown by Sea-
board's records. Such inventory was subsequently shown by 
Bridgeport's audited statements for the year ended December 
31, 1947, to have been overstated by $635,000. 5/ 
From May 1946 when Seaboard made an initial advance of 
$90,000 to Ripley, which manufactured toy calliopes and 
electronic products, to the time of the 1947 audit, Ripley did 
not make a profit on any of its products and required 
5/ Bridgeport's audited statements for 1947, which were fur-
nished Seaboard in May 1948, also showed that on sales of 
$846,511 for 1947 Bridgeport had a loss of $772,820; and 
that at December 31, 1947 it had a deficit of $728,764. 
Bridgeport's losses and debt continued to advance after 
December 31, 1947, and on June 30, 1948, it owed Seaboard 
$1,897,423 and had a deficit of $1,028,764. 
Bridgeport was placed in bankruptcy late in 1948 and Sea-
board realized about $203,000 out of its then advances of 
approximately $1,800,000. 
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continuous advances. For the 1946 fiscal year ended February 
28, 1947, Ripley's losses were $427,070 on sales of $396,964. 
Ripley's debt to Seaboard at that time was $350,632. Its net 
worth of $207,568 included an amount of $121,839 of surplus 
resulting from a reappraisal of assets. 
As with the other companies, new management was resorted 
to, which in this instance was brought in early in 1947 and 
again there were optimistic statements that the new officials 
had constructive plans and were making progress. These plans 
included programs to substantially reduce Seaboard's advances 
by liquidating non-usable assets and selling Ripley's plant, 
but neither effort had been successful and for the 10 months 
ended December 31, 1947, Ripley had losses of $104,837 on 
sales of $220,715. Ripley's debt to Seaboard at December 31, 
1947 was $308,402 6/ and at February 4, 1948, the indebtedness 
had increased to $330,592. 7/ 
Technical 
Seaboard made its first loan to Technical, a company en-
gaged in the manufacture of electronic and photographic pro-
ducts, in May 1946 in the amount of $160,000. Due to insuf-
ficient capital, inadequate production volume and other 
factors, Technical incurred losses through 1946 and 1947. 
In December 1946 Seaboard officials were so concerned 
that Technical was advised that no delay in effectuating im-
provements in the situation could be tolerated. In February 
1947 a survey of the Technical situation prepared by Seaboard 
officials listed numerous unfavorable factors and none of a 
favorable character. Notwithstanding continuous attention 
from Seaboard, Technical's losses continued and Seaboard made 
additional advances. As of December 31, 1947, Seaboard's 
advances had increased to $460,000 and Technical had a deficit 
of $57,900. 
6/ The reductions from the amount due in February 1947 re-
sulted from Ripley's assignment to Seaboard of a tax refund 
of $191,000 due Ripley on a carry back of Ripley's loss of 
$424,000 in 1946. 
7/ On June 30, 1948, Ripley owed Seaboard $388,470 and had a 
deficit of $124,766. In September 1948 Seaboard forgave 
$150,000 of Ripley's indebtedness and reduced the interest 
rate on the remaining $231,000. In September 1952 Ripley 
still owed Seaboard about $40,000. 
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In the latter part of 1947 Seaboard officials again 
reported that the situation looked hopeless. Seaboard was 
instrumental in obtaining new management, which was ac-
companied by optimistic statements that now progress was being 
made and earnings could be anticipated and the Seaboard debt 
reduced. However losses by Technical and advances by Seaboard 
continued in 1948. 7a/ 
Varet 
Varet was organized by Seaboard in November 1947 to 
acquire Fairhue Sportswear Co. ("Fairhue") and a predecessor, 
Varet Knitting Mills. Fairhue had been in the business of 
selling sweaters made by Varet Knitting Mills, and Seaboard 
made an initial advance to Fairhue in March 1946. Late in 
1946 the market for sweaters collapsed and left Fairhue with 
an overstocked inventory of wartime yarn and sweaters. In 
August 1946, Seaboard's advances totalled $250,079, of which 
$175,000 was against inventory. 
Efforts by Fairhue and Seaboard to dispose of the in-
ventory were on the whole unsuccessful during the entire 
period from late in 1946 to the end of 1947, and Seaboards 
advances increased to $257,942 at December 31, 1946, at 
which time $225,250 was against inventory, and to $644,534 
at December 31, 1947, at which time $434,148 was against in-
ventory. The extent of the inventory problem is indicated 
by the fact that at September 30, 1947, Fairhue's sales for 
the previous 8 months totalled $39,351 while its inventory 
was $473,666. 
Following unsuccessful efforts to sell a new line of 
knitted wear and the incurring of operating losses by Fairhue, 
Seaboard in November and December 1947 took over, through the 
medium of Varet and another new corporation, Knitted 
Specialties, Inc., the assets of Fairhue, consisting mainly 
7a/ At the end of March Seaboard's advances totalled $573,000 
and Technical had a deficit of $91,000; at the end of May 
the advances were $696,000 and the deficit was $122,000. 
Technical also was put in bankruptcy in late 1948, and 
Seaboard realized approximately $163,000 on its then claim 
of about $761,000. 
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of the frozen inventory. As of December 31, 1947, Varet owed 
Seaboard $644,534 and Knitted Specialties owed $38,027. 
Varet's debt to Seaboard increased to $651,069 at February 4, 
1948. 8/ 
Coastal 
Seaboard's relation to Coastal had its origin in an 
initial loan of $20,000 in March 194l to Automatic Machinery 
Manufacturing Corporation ("Automatic Machinery"), a company 
in the machine tool business. Seaboard's advances to Auto-
matic Machinery increased substantially and amounted to 
$1,918,357 in December 1942, at which time Automatic Machinery 
had a deficit of $107,579. Seaboard thereupon caused the 
stock of Automatic Machinery to be transferred to Bolton Manu-
facturing Company, a company engaged in making aircraft parts, 
whose outstanding stock Seaboard at the same time purchased 
for $412,500. Seaboard then organized a new company, Bolton 
Manufacturing Corporation ("Bolton") which took over the assets 
and liabilities of Bolton Manufacturing Company and merged 
with Automatic Machinery. The result of these transactions 
was that at the end of 1942 Seaboard owned all the stock of 
Bolton, representing an investment of $412,500, and that 
Bolton owed Seaboard $1,918,357' representing Automatic 
Machinery's obligation to Seaboard assumed by Bolton. 
In July 1943 Seaboard organized Coastal, purchased its 
stock for $300,000 and advanced it $350,000. With these funds 
Coastal paid Bolton approximately $550,000 for certain of the 
latter's assets, and Coastal began the manufacture of machine 
tools and various machinery operations. Bolton used the 
$550,000 together with proceeds of certain contract cancel-
lation claims to reduce its indebtedness to Seaboard to 
$841,000 at the end of 1943. 
In the five months to December 31, 1943, Coastal had a 
loss of $49,889, and Seaboard in its report filed with us for 
1943 carried its $300,000 investment in Coastal at $100,000, 
its cost less a reserve of $200,000. As a result of profitable 
8/ Although a new Varet management was installed in March, 
1948, Seaboard instructed Varet to cease operations and 
to liquidate. By June 30, 1948, Seaboard's claim totalled 
$700,139 and Varet had a net worth deficit of $450,000. 
As of July 31, 1948, Seaboard estimated that its proceeds 
from liquidation would amount to approximately $115,000 
against then outstanding claims of $660,244, and set up a 
reserve for its anticipated loss of $545,244. 
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wartime operations, by the end of 1945 the entire indebted-
ness to Seaboard of both Coastal and Bolton had been paid, 
and Seaboard eliminated the reserve and stated its invest-
ment in Coastal at $300,000. At the same time Seaboard set 
up a reserve of $200,000 for its investment in Bolton which 
with the end of the war had discontinued its production of 
aircraft parts, and stated its investment in that company at 
$212,500 instead of the previous $412,500. 
Although by the end of 1946 Bolton had become inactive, 
Seaboard continued to carry its investment at $212,500, and 
its equity in Bolton was stated at $239,739. Bolton's assets, 
however included an amount of $179,747 due it on advances it 
had made to Coastal. Coastal, which had theretofore ceased 
its production of war goods, also owed Seaboard $607,286 and 
had suffered a loss in 1946 of $155,163 before a tax refund 
of $146,384, and a net loss of $8,779 after such refund. 
Coastal's losses increased in 1947 to $1,135,353 before tax 
refunds and $661,473 after such refunds. Its liabilities 
exceeded its assets by almost $134,000. 
At this point Seaboard reshuffled its investments in 
Coastal and Bolton. In November 1947 it donated its invest-
ment in Coastal, carried at $300,000, to Bolton, and in-
creased its stated investment in Bolton from $212,500 to 
$512,500. On December 31, 1947, Bolton wrote off as worth-
less its $300,000 investment in Coastal and its advances to 
Coastal of $191,419 by charges to its profit and loss account, 
as a result of which Bolton reported a net loss of $326,244 
for 1947. Bolton took over Coastal's assets and liabilities, 
including indebtedness to Seaboard, which totalled $618,535 
as of December 31, 1947, and assumed the name of Coastal. 
At December 31, 1947, Seaboard carried its investment 
in Coastal at $512,500 and its advances to that company at 
$6l8,535. As of the same date, Coastal wrote up its assets 
by $439,378 to reflect their reproduction cost as determined 
by a reappraisal made a year earlier. By this write-up, 
Coastal's net worth was increased from $80,000 to $519,321. 
Thereafter Coastal's losses and Seaboard's advances continued 
to increase. 9 / 
9/ Coastal's indebtedness to Seaboard increased to $750,000 
at June 1948, and its losses for the preceding six months 
were $195,000 before possible inventory adjustments which 
would have increased the loss. It appears that on the 
subsequent liquidation of Coastal, Seaboard realized on 
its total investment and advances of in excess of 
$1,100,000, only about $145,000 in cash and a mortgage 
for about $120,000. 
The above is a brief summary of the mass of evidence 
and exhibits in the record showing the troubles faced by Sea-
board at the time of TN's audit. The condition of the six 
companies described above had deteriorated drastically during 
1947, and the sharp increase in Seaboard's advances to these 
companies was contrary to Seaboard's desires and expec-
tations. 10/ Notwithstanding numerous statements to or by 
Seaboard's management that the advances soon would be re-
duced or liquidated, the record is replete with instances of 
expressions by Seaboard of great concern over the size and 
condition of the accounts, not only throughout 1947, but 
even in late 1946, when the amounts advanced were substantial-
ly less than they were at the end of 1947. Not only did the 
advances increase in the face of generally increasing and con-
tinuing losses by the six companies, but more and more such 
advances were against inventories, as well as other less de-
sirable forms of collateral such as mortgages, or even totally 
unsecured, and less and less against Seaboard's traditional 
and preferred stype of collateral, accounts receivable of the 
debtors. And this concentration on inventory financing was 
in the face of Seaboard's adoption at the end of 1946 of 
plans and programs to liquidate its inventory advances, and 
of an announcement by it in its annual report to stockholders 
for 1946 that its program for 1947 was to increase the busi-
ness of its accounts receivable division and to reduce its 
inventory financing. 11/ 
With this background, we turn to a consideration of the 
circumstances of the audit made by TN as of December 31, 1947, 
the questions that developed therein, and the treatment of 
such questions by TN. 
The Audit 
Touche, Niven & Co., one of three firms which consoli-
dated on September 1, 1947 to form TN, had been the auditors 
of Seaboard for over 15 years. Thomas W. Brown, who, as a 
partner of Touche, Niven & Co., had supervised prior Seaboard 
audits, was the partner in charge of the 1947 audit. 12/ 
10/ There were other less important accounts, some of which 
will be referred to subsequently, which also presented 
problems as of December 31, 1947. 
11/ As of December 31, 1947, Seaboard carried total receivables 
of $5,700,000, of which $2,600,000 represented stated ad-
vances against inventory. 
12/ Brown died in 1950 before the institution of these pro-
ceedings. 
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Also initially assigned to the Seaboard audit, which was com-
menced in late December, 1947, were respondents Werntz 
and Blomquist. Werntz, after serving for a number of years 
as Chief Accountant of this Commission, had joined one of the 
firms which formed TN, shortly before the formation of TN. 
At the time of the Seaboard audit, he occupied the status of 
principal accountant with responsibility for making many of 
the decisions with respect to the audit. 13/ Blomquist was 
the senior in charge of the field work. 
As a result of the information gathered by Blomquist 
in the course of the regular audit procedures, Brown and 
Werntz became aware of the drastic deterioration in Seaboard's 
condition during 1947, and instructed Blomquist to undertake 
certain supplementary audit procedures, consisting primarily 
of an examination of the credit files maintained by Seaboard 
on its major accounts. The data obtained showed that TN was 
faced with a situation quite out of the ordinary and differ-
ing greatly from prior audits. It showed that Seaboard was 
seriously involved in the six financially troubled companies 
described above, and that despite optimistic reports by Sea-
board officers in 1946 and 1947 limits placed on advances to 
those companies had in many instances been exceeded, and 
there was a real possibility of substantial losses on these 
advances. 
Brown and Werntz concluded that Seaboard's book reserve 
of about $119,000 for possible losses was clearly inadequate 
and that substantial amounts of receivables were improperly 
classified as current assets. After Blomquist completed his 
field work on February 16, 1948, he was asked to prepare an 
estimate of a reserve for probable losses, and he arrived at 
a figure of $1,453,551, not including any provision for 
Coastal, whose accounts TN audited directly. At about the same 
time, Werntz prepared a memorandum summarizing the information 
obtained regarding Seaboard's major accounts including Coastal. 
Werntz's memorandum noted the shrinkage or disappearance 
during 1947 of the excess of advances to the six companies over 
the receivables and inventories securing such advances and that 
of the total advances to these companies of over $4,600,000 
only about $336,000 was against accounts receivables whereas 
almost $2,600,000 was against inventories and the balance was 
unsecured. The memorandum stated that Amity owed Seaboard over 
$1,000,000, that Amity had lost $508,000 in the year ended 
October 31, 1947 and had a deficit, as of that date, of 
$435,600. As to Bridgeport, the memorandum showed that there 
13/ Werntz became a partner of TN in 1950. 
- 13 - A - 78 
was only approximately $1,000 of net worth as a cushion for 
Seaboard loans of around $1,467,000; that Bridgeport's un-
audited financial statements at November 30, 1947 indicated 
an 11-month loss of $75,000 on sales of $788,000 and that 
Bridgeport's total stated assets of $1,592,000 included an 
inventory of $1,068,000; and that a Seaboard auditor had 
reported Bridgeport's inventory to be overstated by $102,694. 
With respect to Ripley, the memorandum recited that the last 
balance sheet made available to TN was that of July 31, 1946, 
that the primary problem was to secure at least twice the 
volume of sales that had thus far been obtained, and that 
operating losses continued into January, 1948. Technical's 
latest available statements as of July 31, 1947, were de-
scribed as showing an excess of liabilities over assets of 
$30,000 and May-July 1947 losses of $11,000 on sales of 
$115,000. Varet's substantially over-stocked inventory and 
the absence in Seaboard's credit file of any financial state-
ments or other definite information as to Varet's financial 
status were also referred to,, As to Coastal, the memorandum 
stated that TN's audit of that company for 1947 showed ten-
tative figures for net assets of $502,758 after a write-up 
of fixed assets at reappraisal figures some $350,000 in ex-
cess of book values and that Coastal during 1947 had an 
$800,000 loss from operations, and it raised the questions 
of whether any part of the Coastal debt could be considered 
a current asset by Seaboard and whether Seaboard needed a 
reserve against its investment in Coastal, The memorandum 
concluded that the validity of the accounts and the propriety 
of their classification as current assets were extremely 
important questions. 
These matters were discussed with Seaboard's manage-
ment at a meeting held on March 1, 1948, at which Seaboard 
took the position that its book reserve of about $119,000 
was adequate. Following the meeting and on the basis of the 
then available information, Brown arrived at an estimated 
reserve of $1,345,600, not including any reserve for Coastal, 
and in addition listed as non-current assets $1,374,000 of 
advances to the five companies plus $318,535 of advances to 
Coastal, or a total of $1,692,535. Werntz made similar nota-
tions, apparently on the basis of Brown's figures. 
A series of further conferences with Seaboard's manage-
ment culminated in the certification on March 19, 1948 of 
financial statements which reflected a reserve for losses 
and contingencies of $857,729, created by a charge to surplus 
of $750,000, and classified advances of $318,535 to Coastal 
and $641,713 to the other five companies as non-current assets. 
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The record shows that Blomquist's function in the 
Seaboard audit was to get the information required by the 
regular audit procedures and the supplemental instructions 
given him by Brown and Werntz and to prepare appropriate work-
ing papers and an estimated reserve figure. He had no part 
in the final decisions as to the amount of the reserves or the 
other matters in issue in these proceedings, did not partici-
pate in any of the meetings with the Seaboard management, did 
not participate in the preparation of the TN certificate, and 
did not know what conclusions had been reached by the other 
representatives of TN until after the completion of the finan-
cial statements and their delivery to Seaboard. Under the cir-
cumstances we conclude, as recommended by the Staff and the 
hearing examiner, that the proceedings as to Blomquist should 
be dismissed. For convenience, hereinafter references to 
respondents shall mean the firm of TN and its individual rep-
resentatives other than Blomquist. 
The Reserve for Losses 
The major issues in these proceedings are whether the 
reserve of $857,729 for losses and contingencies included in 
the financial statements certified by TN was materially in-
adequate, and whether the respondents, in certifying to the 
statements including this reserve, failed to follow generally 
accepted auditing standards and procedures and failed to exer-
cise an independent and informed judgment thereon. 
Respondents do not deny that Seaboard's condition had 
deteriorated drastically in 1947, that its loans and advances 
were concentrated unduly in six companies which had very 
serious difficulties, that there were grave doubts the ad-
vances to these companies could be collected in full, and 
that the information available to them in the course of their 
audit clearly indicated that a large reserve was needed. On 
the contrary, respondents contend that their audit procedures 
disclosed the seriousness of the situation and the need for 
a large reserve and that a large reserve - $857,000 - was in 
fact provided. They contend further that the reserve was 
adequate on the basis of the facts available to them at the 
time of the audit, and that any attempt to attack the reason-
ableness of the reserve on the basis of the fact that Seaboard 
subsequently become insolvent and ultimately suffered losses 
greatly in excess of the reserve provided, is an improper 
attempt to judge respondents on the basis of hindsight. 
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Inadequacy of Reserve for Accounts other than Coastal 
We turn first to a consideration of the question of 
the adequacy of the reserve for the advances to the five 
principal debtors, exclusive of Coastal, in the light of the 
information available to respondents in the January-March 1948 
period during which the audit was conducted. As noted above, 
as a result of Blomquist's reports indicating the existence 
of serious difficulties in Seaboard and its principal accounts, 
he was instructed to undertake supplementary audit procedures 
and to prepare an estimate of the reserve required by Seaboard. 
Respondents, while commending the thoroughness of Blomquist's 
audit procedures, contend that his $1,453,551 estimate was 
only a tentative figure and that he might well have agreed to 
its reduction if he had obtained the additional information 
presented at the subsequent extended discussions with Seaboard. 
Blomquist testified that his reserve estimate was based 
on all the information obtained by him from Seaboard's records 
and credit files and that he took into account, among other 
factors, that the advances to the principal accounts had 
steadily increased throughout 1947 and those companies had 
operating losses in 1947; that the service charges on the 
advances were generally being accumulated and in some cases 
the Seaboard directors had discontinued such charges because 
the companies could not pay them; and that the principal 
accounts had no funds and the only payments they might make 
would be out of funds advanced by Seaboard. Blomquist further 
testified that he himself made no allowance for a reserve as 
to Coastal because he knew that TN also audited Coastal and 
he assumed his associates would take the factors there pre-
sented into account. Blomquist gave Werntz his work papers 
containing his reserve calculations and discussed his figures 
with him several times. He testified that Werntz stated his 
estimated reserve was the starting point for the conference 
with Seaboard and that Seaboard would have to prove to TN 
that such reserve was wrong. 
The first conference with the Seaboard management on 
March 1, 1948, was attended by Brown and Werntz for TN, and 
by Babcock, Andrew B. Rose, vice-president, and Frederick L. 
Burns, secretary-treasurer, for Seaboard. The. Seaboard repre-
sentatives took the position that no reserve was required for 
any of the major accounts, with the exception of Varet, as to 
which they stated a reserve of $75,000 to $100,000 might be 
necessary. Brown and Werntz were further told that the loans 
to these companies were close to, or had already reached, their 
peak, that the companies had turned the corner, and that very 
substantial reductions in the advances would be made prior to 
the end of 1948 and in some instances more immediately. How-
ever, no concrete facts to support these conclusions were 
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presented, the representations of the Seaboard management con-
sisting largely of expressions of confidence that the new 
managements of the debtors could work out the existing diffi-
culties . 
For example, with respect to Amity, it was stated that 
the head of Seaboard's advisory service had assumed the active 
management of Amity and Seaboard had every confidence that he 
would be able to cure the production and marketing problems 
which Amity had experienced in connection with its peacetime 
products and put Amity in a position in which it could reduce 
advances from Seaboard, that steps were being taken to achieve 
those objectives and it was felt that substantial orders for 
such products would be obtained, that investigations were in 
progress looking toward obtaining new products which it was 
thought would enable Amity to attain a profitable volume, 
and that parts of the inventory would be liquidated to obtain 
as much cash as possible and Amity would concentrate on its 
remaining business. 
The statements made regarding Bridgeport, Ripley, 
Technical and Varet were in a similar vein. Babcock's ex-
position of the future prospects of these companies was re-
plete with such statements as that the new managements were 
experienced people and that he "believed" that under their 
direction the "troubles would be worked out", that "a program 
for the reduction of expenses" had been worked out, that 
Seaboard management "felt" that new products "would have an 
excellent market and would result in substantial and profit-
able business", that Seaboard "felt" that new management 
"would be able to place the company on a profitable basis" 
and was "interested in developing" what "looked to be a very 
promising product". 
These representations of Seaboard's management were 
not substantially different from the information obtained by 
Blomquist. He testified that the minutes of the monthly 
meetings of Seaboard's board of directors repeatedly recited 
that the losses in the six companies were expected to end in 
the next month or shortly thereafter and that he also saw 
numerous references to future possibilities and expectations, 
He gave consideration to these stated expectations as well 
as to the fact that none of them had materialized. 
Nor does it appear that Brown and Werntz were overly 
impressed with the information presented to them at the March 
1 conference. As noted above, following that meeting Brown 
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calculated a reserve of $1,345,600 exclusive of Coastal, 14/ 
and Werntz copied Brown's reserve figures. Brown's calcula-
tion was entitled "Theoretical loss based on information 
presently available" and was composed of the following 
items: $485,600 for Amity, $60,000 for Bridgeport, $50,000 
for Technical, $100,000 for Varet, $150,000 for "Tax claims", 
and $500,000 for "General (based on inadequacy last year)". 
At about the same time he made a similar calculation, arriv-
ing at a figure of $1,350,000 which he labelled "Estimated 
loss based on available financial statements". 
The record shows that for some time after the March 
1 meeting respondents were still using an estimated or 
tentative reserve figure of $1,350,000. An audit memoran-
dum prepared by Brown and Werntz in April 1948 states that 
following the March 1 conference and after discussions among 
TN partners a preliminary report of examination was prepared 
as a means of presenting TN's view to Seaboard, which "took 
exception to the classification of certain items as current 
assets and indicated a need for a substantial reserve for 
possible losses. Tentatively, the drafts of the certificate 
indicated outside limits of about $1,300,000 on the reserve 
and $1,500,000 for exclusions from current assets." A 
draft certificate prepared after March 1 stated that on the 
basis of the financial condition of the debtors a "substan-
tial reserve, probably in excess of $1,350,000 is required", 
and that approximately $1,500,000 "should be excluded from 
14/ The respondents contend that Brown's estimate should be 
reduced by $73,700 to reflect possible refunds of Federal 
income taxes resulting from carry-backs of losses. They 
also contend that Brown's computation included $150,000 
as a reserve against the tax claims purchased by Seaboard 
from Bolton and Coastal and that this reserve against the 
tax claims was later determined to be unnecessary. They 
contend, therefore, that for comparison purposes Brown's 
estimated reserve was not $1,345,600, but $1,121,900. How-
ever, the possibility of a tax refund of $73,700 presup-
posed charging the additional reserve against the income 
account in order for Seaboard to show a loss. There is 
no evidence that Seaboard intended to do this, and in 
fact the increase in the reserve of $750,000 ultimately 
adopted was not charged to income but directly to surplus. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that no reserve for the tax 
claims was necessary; on the contrary, TN's certificate 
itself, in its final form showed that the reserve provided 
was intended to cover possible claims arising from Sea-
board's agreement to reimburse Coastal for any refunds 
required in connection with the tax claims assigned to 
Seaboard. 
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current assets as not realizable within one year". 
Respondents deny that the $1,350,000 figure was made 
known to the Seaboard representatives. However, Babcock, Rose 
and Burns all testified that the TN representatives first men-
tioned a figure in excess of $1,000,000 as the amount of the 
required reserve. The Brown-Werntz audit memorandum states 
that at the second meeting held on March 6th Babcock and Rose 
again reviewed the financial status of the principal accounts 
"after examining the draft report". 15/ But whether or not 
TN informed Seaboard of the $1,350,000 reserve figure, it is 
clear that it was TN's opinion that the required reserve was 
in the neighborhood of $1,350,000 up to March 12, when ad-
mittedly a draft certificate expressing this opinion was taken 
by TN to the conference with the Seaboard management. 
Respondents have repeatedly characterized their initial 
figures as tentative, implying that they were therefore not 
significant. In a sense all figures are tentative until 
financial statements are ultimately set up in final forms and 
certified. But this does not detract from the weight to be 
given respondents' figures as representing their best judgment 
at the time as experienced public accountants dealing with 
questions of the utmost importance in their audit. 
15/ Respondents contend that the words "draft report" refer to 
the financial statements, and that the "certificate" which 
contained the statement regarding the amount of the reserve 
was a separate document and was not shown to Seaboard. This 
does not appear to be a reasonable construction of the 
words used in the Brown-Werntz memorandum, particularly in 
the light of the statement therein that the "report" took 
exception to the classification of assets and indicated a 
need for a substantial reserve, and the fact that an 
auditor's statement about the accounts he has examined is 
called both a report and a certificate and the terms are 
commonly regarded as interchangeable. See American 
Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 
9, May, 1941. We also note that in a draft of the Brown-
Werntz memorandum the word "certificate" was used where 
"report" appears in the final form and was crossed out in 
ink and replaced by "report". 
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Although no additional significant information was pre-
sented by Seaboard after March 1, 16/ respondents subsequently 
receded from their opinion as to the size of the necessary 
reserve and gave Seaboard an unqualified certificate on the 
basis of a reserve of $857,729. Respondents urge that they 
properly gave consideration to the judgment of the Seaboard 
management as to the prospective earning power of the debtors. 
However, estimates of reasonably prospective earnings should 
be based on "past earnings, adjusted to reflect the influence 
of changes which have already taken place and those that are 
reasonably foreseeable". 17/ Respondents did not follow this 
course in adopting the $857,729 reserve figure. 
Although the known earnings history of the six debtor 
companies was admittedly very bad, as to some of those com-
panies respondents did not see current earnings figures and 
did not seek financial statements as of the end of 1947 or 
for January or February 1948. The latest financial statements 
seen by the respondents were those of October 31, 1947 for 
Amity, November 30, 1947 for Bridgeport (unaudited), July 31, 
1946 for Ripley (unaudited), 18/ and July 31, 1947 for Technical 
(unaudited). They saw no financial statements on Varet or 
its predecessors. Under the circumstances existing at the 
time of the audit, proper auditing procedure required that 
respondents obtain the latest financial information which was 
16/ Some of the conferences after March 1 were attended 
by respondents Hall and Mendes, for whom the management 
reiterated the information about these companies previous 
ly given Brown and Werntz. Werntz was absent on another 
project following March 14 and did not attend the subse-
quent conferences; he testified, however, that TN had 
determined on $857,729 as the appropriate figure and so 
informed Seaboard on March 12 before he left. 
17/ See Minnesota and Ontario Paper Company, 7 S.E.C. 456, 
— 476 (1046). 
18/ Respondents contend that additional financial information 
regarding Ripley was furnished by Seaboard during the 
conferences, but there is no indication as to what such 
information consisted of and it does not appear that 
respondents saw any up-to-date earnings statement. 
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available prior to completion of the audit, 19/ in order to 
give them a basis on which to assess the reasonableness of 
Seaboard's representations. Had such information been ob-
tained, it would have shown that in general the six companies 
continued to lose money and to require and receive further 
advances from Seaboard during the last of 1947 and the first 
months of 1948. 
Respondents have attempted to justify their failure to 
obtain more recent financial statements on the grounds, among 
others, that Seaboard's close contact with the debtor compa-
nies made its judgment and intentions more significant than 
more current or audited statements of the companies since 
the latter were not in good financial condition and "in the 
course of rehabilitation financing of this type it was not 
unusual for there to be deficits from operations, low current 
ratios and other unfavorable financial conditions." This 
explanation is not persuasive. Aside from the unwarranted 
premise that Seaboard was of its own accord engaged in re-
habilitation financing, 20/ the respondents' attempt to 
minimize the significance of more current financial state-
ments seems particularly inappropriate in view of the fact 
that in the computation of the final reserve of $857,729, 
the only specific reserve figures listed were approximately 
the amounts of the deficits shown by the financial statements 
19/ Among financial statements which were available prior to 
completion of the audit were Ripley statements as of 
February 28, 1947 and December 31,1947, Technical state-
ments for the year ended December 31, 1947, and Fairhue 
and Varet Knitting Mills statements as of September 30, 
1947. 
20/ Seaboard was not voluntarily in the business of financing 
companies in need of rehabilitation. Seaboard's normal 
business, as described to its bankers and in its finan-
cial statements and reports to its stockholders and this 
Commission, was that of a regular commercial finance 
company, which was primarily interested in making short-
term collateralized loans, principally against accounts 
receivable, to provide needed working capital for manu-
facturing and industrial concerns which, because of in-
adequate working capital, an insufficient record of past 
operating profits, or similar reasons, were unable to 
command bank credit. The record is clear that Seaboard's 
loans to its major accounts started as ordinary finance 
loans, without any intention or expectation on Seaboard's 
part of financing companies needing rehabilitation, and 
that the deterioration in the condition of these companies, 
far from being anticipated as a normal situation, was 
(Continued) 
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of Amity as of October 31, 1947 and of Technical as of July 
31, 1947. 21/ 
Respondents' failure to request more current financial 
statements or to communicate with or inspect any of the under-
lying companies indicates that they deferred to the judgment 
of Seaboard's management in reducing their estimate of the 
needed reserve. While respondents did not follow the view of 
Seaboard's management that no increase at all over the book 
reserve of $119,000 was required, that view was so obviously 
and radically wrong that not only was its rejection required 
but it so destroyed the reliability of the management's judg-
ment that respondents were not justified, in the absence of 
concrete supporting facts, in accepting such judgment as a 
basis for reducing to $857,729 their original reserve esti-
mate of about $1,350,000. 
Respondents assert that two significant and persuasive 
"facts" were presented by Seaboard management in support of a 
lower reserve figure: (l) Seaboard's future expectations for 
the six companies; and (2) Seaboard's past experience in 
20 contd./ 
completely contrary to the expectations of Seaboard and 
developed in spite of all that Seaboard could do by way 
of funds and management assistance. 
21/ The Brown-Werntz memorandum of April 1948 explaining the 
$857,729 reserve stated that that figure represented the 
conclusion that at December 31, 1947 there existed un-
realized losses of $435,600 with respect to Amity and 
$30,000 with respect to Technical and that a general 
reserve of not less than $350,000 would be necessary as 
a provision against possible further losses and tax con-
tingencies. The $30,000 provided for Technical was the 
amount of Technical's deficit at July 31, 1947, as re-
flected in Blomquist's work papers. By December 31, 1947, 
however, the Technical deficit was almost doubled, increas-
ing to $57,908. Respondents claim that the Technical 
December 31, 1947 financial statements which were not 
mailed to Seaboard until March 8, 1948, "were not avail-
able" to them. However, it does not appear that if re-
spondents had asked for them they could not have obtained 
those statements prior to the conclusion of their audit. 
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successfully rehabilitating other companies. As to (l), there 
was nothing really new presented since Seaboard's future ex-
pectations had been well known to Blomquist through his ex-
amination of the minute books and credit files of Seaboard; as 
to (2), Seaboard's past experience with other companies was not 
comparable to the situation confronting it at the end of 1947, 
and in any event was more than offset by its actual experience 
with the very companies whose future was in issue.22/ 
No cost or other specific data was presented to show any 
real prospects of improvement in the abnormal situation which 
was found. Blomquist testified that he was not impressed with 
Seaboard's general assurances and expectations based on new 
managements and possible new products. That respondents also 
did not find persuasive the information supplied is also shown 
by the fact, previously noted, that as late as March 12, and 
after the information of past performance was furnished them, 
respondents were still using a draft of a certificate indicat-
ing a need for a reserve of at least $1,350,000. While the 
fact that a company has been losing money does not mean that 
it will necessarily continue to do so, an independent certify-
ing accountant cannot, consistent with proper professional 
standards, rely on management's unverified representations 
that the company is about to turn the corner, particularly 
where, as in this case, the auditors knew that a serious 
22/ A schedule was furnished by Seaboard at a meeting held on 
March 9 which summarized the financial history of a number 
of companies who had previously been indebted to Seaboard. 
Those companies differed in material respects from Sea-
board's major accounts at December 31, 1947. For example, 
several of the companies were enabled to repay their in-
debtedness through war contracts. In at least some cases, 
the indebtedness was adequately collateralized, largely 
by accounts receivable. Only one of the companies had a net 
worth deficit at the time of the maximum debt to Seaboard, 
while one other company apparently would have had a deficit 
but for an appraisal. All the others had substantial net 
worths. 
It may also be noted that one of the companies listed on 
the schedule was Automatic Machinery. As previously noted, 
Seaboard's initial loan to that company of $20,000 in 1941 
increased to $1,918,357 in December 1942, at which time Auto-
matic Machinery had a deficit of $107,579 and was merged 
with Seaboard's wholly-owned subsidiary, Bolton Manufacturing 
Company, and the operations it had pursued were discontinued. 
Bolton's wartime operations enabled it to pay off the in-
debtedness inherited from Automatic Machinery, but thereafter 
it and its offshoot Coastal were in constant difficulties 
and Seaboard's investments and advances exceeded $1,000,000. 
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deterioration had taken place and management's representa-
tions that progress was being made had failed to materialize 
in the past and were contradicted by every known fact. 23/ 
A significant and important respect in which respondents 
failed to ascertain the facts essential to the determination 
of an appropriate reserve figure was their failure to deter-
mine whether the Bridgeport and Varet inventories pledged as 
collateral with Seaboard were properly stated. 
There were a number of indications that the Bridgeport 
inventory was substantially overstated. The latest state-
ments seen by TN, the unaudited statements of November 30, 
1947, carried the inventory at $1,068,096, an increase of 
almost $500,000 over December 31, 1946, and substantially in 
excess of Bridgeport's sales of $788,171 for the first 11 
months of 1947. In addition Seaboard's minutes and credit 
files disclosed that the inventory accumulation was not due 
to any anticipated demand for Bridgeport's products and that 
Bridgeport lacked a reliable cost system. 
Since Bridgeport's balance sheet as of November 30, 
1947 showed a net worth of only $645 compared with Seaboard's 
advances of $1,347,987, and its inventory account of over 
$1,000,000 represented 67% of its total assets and 89% of its 
current assets, it was of the utmost importance in consider-
ing whether and to what extent a reserve was required by Sea-
board against its advances to Bridgeport to determine whether 
the inventory was overstated. We cannot accept respondents' 
asserted reliance on management's unsupported representations 
concerning the future of Bridgeport as warranting their ignor-
ing the danger signals with respect to the size of Bridge-
port's inventory. And there is no evidence to indicate that 
the respondents, as they claim, ascertained any business facts 
satisfactorily explaining the increase in the inventory. 
23/ In denying that TN relied entirely on the judgment of 
Seaboard management in reducing their original estimate 
of the needed reserve, respondents point out that the 
Seaboard judgment given them was based in part on the 
judgment of some of the officials of the underlying 
companies. But there was no more basis for relying on 
the unsubstantiated expectations of the managements of 
the underlying companies than there was for relying on 
Seaboard's hopes for these companies. 
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Bridgeport's certified year-end financial statements, 
which were received in May 1948, showed that the inventory 
had in fact been grossly overstated by approximately $635,000 
as of December 31, 1947, that as contrasted with Bridgeport's 
reported net worth of $645 as of November 30, 1947 it had a 
deficit of $728,764 as of December 31, 1947, and it had in-
curred a loss of $772,820 in 1947. Although those statements 
were not available to respondents in March 1948 when they 
certified Seaboard's statements, Charles Schneck, manager of 
the accounting firm of S. D. Leidesdorf & Company, which was 
retained by the creditor banks of Seaboard subsequent to the 
TN audit to prepare a balance sheet of Seaboard as of December 
31, 1947, testified that under the circumstances he would have 
obtained an evaluation of the Bridgeport inventory by either 
making a survey of his own or communicating with or awaiting 
the report of the independent accountant. Respondents assert 
that it is unlikely any helpful information could have been 
obtained by contacting the accountant prior to the completion 
of his audit of Bridgeport and they contend their choice was 
to wait until completion of that audit, which would have 
delayed the Seaboard audit by over two months, or to under-
take to satisfy themselves by other means. However, respond-
ents made no attempt to ascertain whether the inventory was 
stated at its proper value other than to talk to Seaboard's 
management, although by their own admission the situation 
confronting them in the Seaboard audit was out of the ordina-
ry, and therefore called for extraordinary measures. 
With respect to the Varet inventory, which respondents 
knew constituted the primary security for Seaboard's advances 
to Varet and was the subject of continuing attempted disposi-
tion, respondents did nothing to substantiate Seaboard's 
representations that with the liquidation of the inventory a 
loss of at most only $100,000 would be sustained on these ad-
vances . Respondents take the position that an on-the-spot 
survey of Varet's affairs, which Schneck suggested as a means 
of establishing the value of the inventory in the absence of 
certified statements, would have been unavailing to accomplish 
that objective. However, when in July 1948 TN, at the request 
of Seaboard's bank creditors, actually made surveys of Sea-
board's principal accounts they reported that as of June 30, 
1948, it appeared that the Varet inventory then stated at 
$534,555 had an estimated realizable value of only $83,600.24/ 
Respondents' failure to go beyond management's statements re-
garding the expected loss is particularly indefensible in the 
24/ By June 30, 1948, Seaboard's advances totalled $700,139 
and Varet had a deficit of $450,000. 
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face of the fact that the respondents at no time during the 
audit saw a financial statement on Varet or its predecessors, 
We find that in certifying the reserve figure of 
$857,729 respondents failed to follow generally accepted audit-
ing standards and procedures and accounting principles and practices. 
Failure to Provide Reserve for Investment in and 
Advances to Coastal 
We have seen that Seaboard at December 31, 1947, stated 
its investment in Coastal at $512,500 and its advances to 
Coastal at $618,535, a total of $1,131,035. At December 31, 
1946, Seaboard had carried its investment in Coastal at 
$300,000, and an investment of $212,500 in Bolton. As previ-
ously noted, in 1947 Seaboard donated its investment of 
$300,000 in Coastal to Bolton, which had become inactive by 
the end of 1946, and correspondingly increased its stated in-
vestment in Bolton from $212,500 to $512,500. Bolton, which 
then acquired Coastal's assets and liabilities and assumed 
its name, wrote off as of December 31, 1947 the donated 
$300,000 investment, $191,419 owed Bolton by Coastal, and 
$133,551 representing the excess of Coastal's liabilities over 
its assets when taken over by Bolton. Notwithstanding these 
write-offs and the fact that in 1947 Coastal had sustained a 
loss of $1,135,353 before and $661,473 after income tax re-
funds, the stated value of the Coastal assets was then written 
up by a net amount of $439,378 on the basis of a year-old re-
production cost appraisal, thereby increasing net worth from 
about $80,000 to $519,321. Coastal's 1947 financial statements 
including the latter figure were certified by TN, and were 
attached as part of the Seaboard annual report filed with us. 
While recognizing that ordinarily an investment in a 
subsidiary may properly be carried at cost despite occasional 
losses, this Commission has stated that 
"evidence of probable loss must be given due 
attention and, where such evidence points to 
an apparently permanent decline in the value 
and earning power of the underlying properties, 
the company holding such investments should 
recognize and make provision for the loss 
either by writing down the investment or by 
setting up a reserve therefor. 
"The issue is, then, whether the available 
evidence indicated so great a probability of 
loss as to require that, in accordance with 
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generally accepted accounting principles, approp-
priate provision therefor be made." 25/ 
The inactivity of Bolton, the substantial continued 
losses of Coastal, and the Bolton write-off of its investment 
in and advances to Coastal as worthless as of December 31, 
1947, were ample evidence of a "permanent decline in the value 
and earning power". That Werntz was not unaware of this is 
shown by his notation dated March 3, 1948, in the audit work 
papers: "Coastal Investment - if Bolton writes off Coastal 
stock doesn't Seaboard have to do the same?" and as noted 
above, Werntz in his February 1948 memorandum summarizing the 
information obtained in the course of the audit, stated that 
one of the problems presented was whether Seaboard needed a 
reserve against its investment in Coastal. 
Respondents contend that no reserve as to Coastal was 
necessary because Coastal's audited balance sheet as of 
December 31, 1947, showed a net worth of $519,321 and Sea-
board's stated investment in Coastal was below that figure, 
and that any attempt to go behind these figures is barred 
because it would constitute an attack on Coastal's audited 
figures and would be outside the issue in these proceedings, 
which relate to the Seaboard audit. 
In our opinion respondents cannot so insulate themselves 
from consideration of the need of a reserve against the Coastal 
investment. While the sufficiency of the Seaboard audit is in 
issue here, the question of the necessity of a reserve against 
the Coastal investment is relevant and material to that issue. 
Coastal was a wholly-owned subsidiary and in accordance with 
our requirements Coastal's certified statements were filed 
with the Seaboard statements, and respondents could not shut 
their eyes to information bearing on that question merely 
because it may have been acquired in the course of their audit 
of Coastal's statements. Moreover, as we have noted above, 
respondents' own Seaboard audit papers contain notations as to 
the need for a reserve against the Coastal investment. 
Even if we were to accept respondents' contention that 
they were entitled to rely on Coastal's audited statements as 
though such statements had been certified by other independent 
25/ Associated Gas and Electric Company, 11 S,E.C. 975, 
1019-20 (1942), See also Montgomery's Auditing, 7th Ed. 
(1949), pp. 288-9. 
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public accountants, we could not agree that the failure to pro-
vide a reserve for the Coastal investment was reasonable and 
in accordance with accepted accounting procedure. The Coastal 
certificate specifically noted that the assets had been re-
stated to reflect reproduction cost on the basis of a year-old 
appraisal with the result that net worth was increased by 
$439,378, and expressed a qualified opinion only and did not 
take responsibility for the value at which the assets were 
carried. To accept without question the net worth figure would 
be to ignore the plain warning on the face of the certificate 
that such net worth was certainly questionable under generally 
accepted accounting principles. And when the fact is con-
sidered that respondents were themselves the certifying account-
ants for Coastal who had questioned and refused to take any 
responsibility for the asset figure, any possible justification 
for a mechanical acceptance of that figure and the resultant 
net worth figure disappears. 
It seems clear that under the circumstances the write-
up of Coastal's assets was a departure from good accounting 
practice and that it was so recognized by the respondents. 
In the Brown-Werntz memorandum of April 1948, it was stated 
that TN questioned the propriety of the restatement of the 
Coastal assets, pointing out that on the transfer of these 
assets to Bolton, the latter had written off its investment 
in Coastal as worthless, and also that Coastal during the pre-
ceding year had operated at a very substantial loss. 26/ 
Werntz testified that at the March 6, 1948, meeting with 
26/ TN's prior questioning of this item highlights the unsound-
ness of respondents' position in these proceedings that any 
question regarding Seaboard's failure to write off the 
$300,000 Coastal investment after Bolton had written if off 
as worthless should be ignored as an improper attempt to 
attack the correctness of the Coastal audit. 
It is also significant that notwithstanding respondents1 
position that both they and we are precluded from going 
behind the audited statement showing Coastal's net worth, 
they themselves point out that the Coastal statements were 
attached to the Seaboard statements and disclosed the ex-
istence of an appraisal write-up and of Coastal's sub-
stantial operating loss in 1947, and that the Seaboard 
statement disclosed the amounts at which the investments 
were carried. They thereby apparently suggest that the 
two statements read together might have enabled a reader 
to ascertain that there was some probability of loss in 
the Coastal investment. We cannot accept such suggestion 
(Continued) 
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Seaboard management, Babcock was told, in connection with the 
several reappraisals of assets of the six companies, that such 
reappraisals were not in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting practice and would require an exception or quali-
fication in an auditor's certificate. Werntz further testi-
fied that at that meeting the Coastal situation was discussed 
with that problem in mind, and it was pointed out that TN was 
going to have to state its qualification on that point in the 
Coastal certificate. 
If the write-up of Coastal's assets were disregarded, 
as it should have been, the net assets behind Seaboard's 
stated investment of $312,500 would have amounted to only 
about $80,000 and a reserve of at least $432,500 should have 
been provided against the Coastal investment or the investment 
should have been written down by a corresponding amount. 27/ 
Language of Certificate 
Respondents also deferred to the desires of Seaboard's 
management with respect to the language of the certificate it-
self. The draft of the certificate contained a paragraph 
reading as follows: 
"A major portion of the corporation's present 
operations consists of the extension of credit 
and the furnishing of advisory services to busi-
nesses which are unable to secure adequate bank 
credit. Rehabilitation of the financial and 
operating conditions of such enterprises neces-
sarily requires a program of increasing advances 
26 contd./ 
as a justification for the failure to carry on the 
Seaboard statement any reserve for the apparent im-
pairment of its investment in Coastal. 
27/ It may also be noted that the Coastal balance sheet in-
cluded a reserve of $142,968, which, as shown by the notes 
to the financial statements, was set up to provide for 
Coastal's liability under the Renegotiation Act governing 
profits on war contracts. However, the Price Adjust-
ment Board in an unilateral order had prior thereto ordered 
a $390,000 refund, so that Coastal's net assets of $80,000 
were subject to even further reduction to the extent the 
final settlement of the $390,000 claim exceeded the $142,968 
reserve. In fact Coastal subsequently agreed to the entry 
of a default judgment for the full amount of $390,000. 
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and results at times in operating losses on the 
part of such enterprises until operating and 
management problems are solved. As the record 
of the performance of this Corporation shows 
. ... the ultimate collectibility of such 
accounts depends upon various factors such as 
(but not limited to) future development of pro-
ducts, improvement in management or change of 
personnel, and sufficient interim financing, 
until the business becomes self-sustaining. 
Thereupon reductions in debt commence and 
accounts ultimately pay out, in some cases with 
marked rapidity, where favorable trends enable 
customers to make substantial earnings, to pro-
cure supplemental financing or to obtain fixed 
long-term capital, or by other means. Accord-
ingly, the Corporation has regularly provided 
out of its earnings a reserve for losses and 
contingencies which at December 31, 1947 
amounted to $107,729.64. In view of the current 
uncertainties in general business conditions, 
both domestic and international, the Corporation 
has added to this a special appropriation of 
$750,000 from earned surplus to provide for 
future contingencies. This reserve, in our 
opinion, is adequate to provide for the tax 
contingencies referred to in Note B and for 
losses which may be incurred in resepct of 
outstanding receivables." 
At a meeting with TN representatives on March 17 or 18, 
Babcock insisted that since Seaboard had agreed to set up the 
minimum reserve TN considered necessary, the certificate should 
read the same as in prior years. Thereupon the quoted language, 
with the exception of the last sentence, was eliminated, but 
with the understanding that similar language would be inserted 
in the notes to the financial statements. However, only the 
next to the last sentence was so added. 
The quoted language had been included in TN's drafts 
of qualified and unqualified certificates, and evidently had 
been considered necessary for an adequate disclosure of the 
situation which had developed at Seaboard, although as we have 
previously indicated it was not an accurate portrayal of Sea-
board's regular business. Respondents' compliance with the 
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wishes of Babcock in this instance constitutes additional evi-
dence of their lack of independence. 28/ 
William C. Keefe, house counsel for Seaboard, advised 
Babcock that the reference in the quoted paragraph to the 
rehabilitation of companies should be deleted because of the 
effect it might have on Seaboard's creditors, 29/ and that 
disclosure in the certificate or in the financial statements 
relating to the nature or condition of the companies Sea-
board was financing at the time would seriously affect Sea-
board's credit with the banks. Respondents assert that they 
were not advised of these reasons, but it seems clear that 
with their experience and background they should have under-
stood that this was why Babcock objected to the proposed 
disclosure. 
Notes to Financial Statements 
Note F to the Seaboard financial statements consisted 
primarily of language used in previous years, plus a paragraph 
relating to the $750,000 addition to the reserve, and read in 
part as follows: 
" . . . Losses resulting from receivables are 
charged to reserve for credit losses as soon as 
a receivable or an unrealized portion thereof 
becomes either bad or doubtful, in the opinion 
of the management . . . 
"The balance in reserve for losses and con-
tingencies remaining after the write-downs and 
write-offs, of all receivables believed to be 
bad or doubtful, as described in the preceding 
paragraph, does not include amounts in respect 
of receivables then known to be bad but is 
28/ Respondents, while denying that the change indicated any 
lack of independence, state in their brief that viewed with 
hindsight in light of the fact that Seaboard later became 
insolvent, it might have been better to have left the 
certificate unchanged or perhaps to have retained the sub-
stance in a footnote. 
29/ Keefe testified that he advised Babcock that "if he was 
telling the banks that he was in this type of 
[rehabilitation] business that was one thing, and if he 
wasn't, he certainly didn't want to be telling it in the 
financial statements." 
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solely against future losses on receivables, 
or future losses not in respect of receivables. 
Therefore, no amount of the balance in reserve 
for losses and contingencies is specifically 
allocated to assets. The reserve could not be 
reflected as a deduction from assets without 
understating such assets. In addition, it is 
believed that such a deduction might suggest that 
the charge-off policy of the enterprise is not as 
complete as above indicated. 
"In view of the current uncertainties and general 
business conditions, both domestic and inter-
national, the Corporation has made a special appro-
priation of $750,000 from earned surplus to provide 
for future contingencies which has been added to 
the reserve regularly provided out of earnings 
making at December 31, 1947 a total reserve for 
losses and contingencies of $857,729.64. Should 
any losses ultimately be sustained in excess of 
the portion of the reserve provided by charges 
against income, provision therefor will be made 
by additional charges to income." 
Under the circumstances existing at the time of the 
audit, this note was materially false and misleading, particu-
larly in indicating that no losses existed in any of the 
accounts, that Seaboard's advances were stated at their esti-
mated realizable value and that any deduction from the re-
serve was intended solely to provide against losses that might 
result from the occurrence of future events. The fact that 
losses did exist at December 31, 1947 is apparent from the 
facts previously recited and is expressly recognized in the 
Brown-Werntz April 1948 memorandum. Moreover, the reference 
in the last paragraph quoted to "current uncertainties and 
general business conditions, both domestic and international," 
fails to give any indication that the additional reserve was 
required because of the specific deterioration of the major 
accounts. 
Respondents' certification to the Seaboard 1947 fi-
nancial statement containing this note is additional evidence 
of their lack of independence. 
Conclusions with Respect to the Reserve 
We find that on the basis of the information known and 
available to respondents at the time of their audit, the 
$857,729 reserve reflected in Seaboard's balance sheet as of 
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December 31, 1947, was materially inadequate, thus resulting 
in an overstatement of earned surplus and net worth, and mak-
ing the balance sheet materially misleading. The inadequacy 
of the reserve was indicated not only by the mass of informa-
tion available to respondents, some of which has been summa-
rized herein, but also by Blomquist's reserve estimate of 
$1,453,551 arrived at on the basis of all the information 
which he developed during the audit, by respondents' own 
subsequent initial judgment that a substantial reserve "proba-
bly in excess of $1,350,000" was needed, and by the failure 
to provide any reserve for the Coastal investment. In certi-
fying the financial statements with the lower reserve figure, 
respondents, contrary to generally accepted auditing standards 
and procedures, improperly placed substantial reliance on un-
supported representations of management as to the future which 
were at direct variance with all the known existing facts, 
without obtaining current financial data on the underlying 
accounts or making any independent inquiry into the value of 
underlying company inventories where the value of such in-
ventories was the principal factor in determining the reason-
ableness of any reserve. In these respects, and in falling to 
disclose in their certificate the true nature or condition of 
Seaboard's accounts, and in not taking exception to Note F to 
the financial statements, respondents did not exercise an in-
dependent and informed Judgment in auditing and certifying 
Seaboard's financial statements. 
Failure to Charge Reserve for Losses Against Income 
In addition to the above conclusions relating to the 
insufficiency of the reserve against uncollectible advances in 
the Seaboard balance sheet as of December 31, 1947, we find 
that Seaboard's income statement for the year 1947 was mis-
leading in that insufficient provision was made therein for 
losses on uncollectible accounts. Under accepted accounting 
principles and standards of fair disclosure, Seaboard's 1947 
income should have been charged with the additional provision 
necessary to bring the reserve up to where its application 
against the receivables outstanding at December 31, 1947, would 
have reduced them to their estimated realizable value. 30/ The 
increase of $750,000 in the reserve insisted upon by respond-
ents was charged directly to earned surplus and as a result the 
Seaboard statement showed a net income for 1947 of $249,800 
before taxes, whereas 
30/ Montgomery's Auditing, 7th Ed. (1949), page 145. 
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if the charge had been made against income, even the inadequate 
reserve increase of $750,000 would have produced a loss of 
approximately $500,000, and respondents' reserve figure of 
$1,350,000 from which they receded would have produced a loss 
of about $1,000,000. 
Respondents, while agreeing that, as stated in Account-
ing Research Bulletin No. 32 of the American Institute of 
Accountants, the general presumption is that "all items of 
profit and loss recognized during the period are to be used 
in determining the figure reported as net income", seek to 
escape its effect in this case by urging that the loss pro-
vided for in the reserve was not realized and was not "recog-
nized" by management. But obviously the propriety of certify-
ing an income statement which fails to charge against income a 
reserve for losses on bad debts cannot be made to turn on the 
fact that management has refused to "recognize" losses which 
all the evidence indicates exist. The deterioration in Sea-
board's accounts which made the increase in the reserve neces-
sary was recognized by respondents as a situation which de-
veloped during 1947. The testimony of respondents, their 
audit papers and memoranda, and their refusal to certify Sea-
board's statements unless an increase in the reserve was 
provided, all serve to confirm this conclusion. The estimated 
losses therefore should have been charged to 1947 operations 
through the income statement. 
Respondents also contend that the reserve is within 
the exception to the quoted presumption which Accounting 
Bulletin No. 32 recognizes for "items which in the aggregate 
are materially significant in relation to the company's net 
income and are clearly not identifiable with or do not result 
from the usual or typical business operations of the period." 
But Seaboard's estimated losses were directly attributable to 
its usual business operations during 1947. That the reserve 
for losses was unusual in relation to the size of reserves for 
prior years did not make it the kind of extraordinary item 
excludable from the determination of net income. 31/ 
31/ Examples of extraordinary items which may be excluded from 
.. the determination of net income under Bulletin No. 32 are 
material losses of a type not usually insured against, 
such as those resulting from wars, riots or earthquakes. 
It is significant that although the increase in the re-
serve for losses was not charged to income, there was in-
cluded in Seaboard's 1947 income statement $542,660 realized 
on the disposition of Seaboard's investment in Southington 
(Continued) 
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We find that under the circumstances respondents' 
certification that the income statement presented fairly the 
results of Seaboard's operations for 1947 in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles, was misleading, and 
evidenced a failure to exercise an independent judgment. 32/ 
Overstatement of Current Assets 
Another major issue in these proceedings is whether 
Seaboard's balance sheet for the year ended December 31, 1947, 
materially overstated current assets and understated non-
current assets. As stated above, the balance sheet as finally 
31 contd./ 
Hardware Manufacturing Company, one of Seaboard's sub-
sidiaries, notwithstanding that Accounting Research Bulle-
tin No. 32, which as seen respondents rely upon as support 
for their failure to include the reserve in the income 
statement, lists among the items excludable from income 
"credits resulting from unusual sales of assets not ac-
quired for resale and not of the type in which the company 
generally deals." And respondents' own memorandum of 
April 1948 recognized that inclusion of the Southington 
item in income "in a year in which it is necessary to set 
up a substantial provision for losses by means of at charge 
to earned surplus may invite a question." We do not accept 
respondents' attempt to distinguish the Southington item 
from the reserve for uncollectible advances on the ground 
that the former represented realized income, whereas the 
latter was only for possible losses which had not been 
recognized by management. 
32/ The misleading nature of the income statement becomes even 
more apparent when it is realized that a very substantial 
part of Seaboard's income was stated to be earned service 
charges on its advances. As we have noted, most of the 
advances outstanding at December 31, 1947 were to companies 
which had been losing money and which could not meet their 
interest and service charges except from amounts advanced 
by Seaboard. 
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certified by respondents listed as non-current $318,535 of 
advances to Coastal and $641,713 of advances to the other 
companies. 33/ 
We have noted that Brown and Werntz recognized early 
during the audit that a major problem facing them was the 
classification of the receivables as current assets, and that 
following the March 1, 1948 conference with Seaboard they pre-
pared schedules which classified $318,535 due from Coastal 
and $1,374,000 due from the other companies as non-current 
assets. 34/ We have also noted that a draft certificate pre-
pared after discussions among the TN partners and which was 
shown to the Seaboard management, took exception to the 
classification of current assets and tentatively indicated 
that approximately $1,500,000 should be excluded from current 
assets "as not realizable within one year." Also, Blomquist, 
in accordance with Werntz's instructions, prepared a tentative 
balance sheet in which $318,561 due from Coastal and $1,346,586 
of advances due from the other companies were classified as 
non-current assets. 
Advances to Companies Other than Coastal 
Respondents seek to justify the use of the $641,713 
figure as the measure of non-current advances to companies 
other than Coastal, and assert that their original higher 
figures were tentative and based on erroneous criteria. We 
are unable to accept this position. 
33/ Respondents' audit memorandum of April 1948 listed the 
items, other than that relating to advances to Coastal, 
transferred to non-current as: 
Amity - Advances against inventories $4l6,713.4l 
Advances against chattel 
mortgages 75,000.00 
Varet - Advances against inventories 100,000.00 
Marvin 0. Shepherd - Advance on note 10,000.00 
Stratford Corporation - Advance on note 40,000.00 
$641,713.41 
34/ In addition, Brown's schedule showed a non-current figure 
of $100,000 for Varet which was not reflected either in 
his total or in Werntz's schedule. 
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As in the case of the original computations of the re-
serve for uncollectible accounts, the initial and larger 
classification for non-current assets apparently represented 
respondents1 best judgment on the basis of the information 
available to them. And it is significant that these larger 
figures were calculated after conferences at which the Sea-
board management expressed its views and after consultations 
among several of TN's partners. The draft balance sheet pre-
pared after the March 6, 1948 conference by Blomquist in 
accordance with instructions from Werntz, appears to be a con-
sidered attempt to segregate amounts which could not be ex-
pected to be collected within a reasonable time in the 
future. 35/ 
Respondents assert that in the course of conferences 
with management they concluded that advances to customers 
could be considered current where the advances did not exceed 
the net assets of the customer, and that amounts of advances 
equal to the deficits of the underlying companies would be 
transferred to non-current. Apart from the question of the 
propriety of using the deficits in the underlying companies 
as the measure of Seaboard's long-term or non-current assets, 
it is clear that the $641,713 figure certified by respondents 
did not actually reflect all such deficits. The respondents 
had failed, as pointed out above, to obtain recent financial 
statements on some of the companies, did not see any fi-
nancial statements on Varet or its predecessors, and were not 
in a position to base the allocation of current and non-current 
35/ The work papers show that the $1,346,586 non-current total 
included $468,000 of advances to Amity, Bridgeport, 
Technical and Varet reportedly secured by chattel and real 
estate mortgages. Since these companies were operating at 
losses and substantially all their accounts receivable and 
inventories were already pledged with Seaboard, it was 
reasonable to assume that they would not have funds in the 
near future to liquidate the advances against the real es-
tate and chattel mortgages. There was also excluded from 
current assets $802,667 representing advances in excess of 
90% of the reported inventory collateral (the contracts 
with Amity, Bridgeport and Varet indicated that advances 
should not exceed 70-75% of inventory pledged as collateral). 
In addition, $75,918 of service charges due from Bridgeport 
which had been accumulating since March 1947 were also 
listed as non-current. Such amounts were unsecured and 
prospects of collecting them would seem to have been more 
remote even than prospects of collecting the advances 
against mortgages and excess inventories. 
A - 78 
- 37 - A - 78 
assets on the existing net asset position of these companies. 
Moreover, the $641,713 figure did not include any amount for 
Technical, although respondents knew that company had a deficit 
of approximately $30,000 as of July 31, 1947, and this deficit 
had increased to approximately $58,000 by December 31, 1947. 
Respondents assert however that their failure to ascer-
tain or eliminate all the advances represented by deficits is 
not material because the deficit test represented merely a 
secondary test in the interest of conservatism, the real justi-
fication for the $641,713 figure being the "business cycle" 
test expressed in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 30 of the 
American Institute of Accountants. That bulletin states that 
current assets may include items "which are reasonably ex-
pected to be realized in cash or sold or consumed during the 
normal operating cycle of the business." Respondents urge 
that Seaboard's business cycle was the relatively long period 
of time required to rehabilitate companies in dire financial 
straits. However, under such view all of Seaboard's advances 
could be considered current, even though collection could not 
be expected for periods of up to three and a half years. 36/ 
Neither Bulletin 30 nor Seaboard's history justified 
the attempt to treat as current assets Seaboard's accounts 
with the companies whose serious financial problems pre-
cipitated the difficulties facing the accountants in the 1947 
audit. As stated, Seaboard's normal business was that of a 
regular commercial finance company primarily interested in mak-
ing short-term collateralized loans, 37/ and Werntz himself 
36/ It was testified that Seaboard's "business cycle" would be 
up to three and a half years on the ground that it would 
take this long to rehabilitate some of the underlying com-
panies. Blomquist testified that from the condition of Sea-
board's accounts at December 31, 1947, it looked like it 
would take a minimum of another two to three and a half 
years to work them out; at least that "was the best hope 
you could have." And since some of these accounts were al-
ready at least two years old, on respondents' theory Sea-
board's "business cycle" would be as long as 5½ years. 
37/ The contention that Seaboard's business cycle was 2 to 3½ 
years (actually over 5 years on the basis of the history of 
its accounts as of December 31, 1947) is in conflict with 
the statement in Seaboard's 1938 stockholders' report, 
after the establishment of its Receivables Division in 1937, 
that it was in a position to liquidate its entire borrowed 
(Continued) 
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testified that the reason why the propriety of the classifi-
cation of these accounts as current became so extremely im-
portant was because he felt that Seaboard would not be able 
to collect the debts "or get them back into a situation where 
they resembled ordinary accounts receivable, possible inven-
tory financing, within a reasonable time in the future". 38/ 
Under the circumstances the classification as "current" 
assets of a commercial credit company of advances to companies 
which had deteriorated to the point where on optimistic esti-
mates 2 to 3½ years was required to work them out, would 
obviously be misleading. 39/ 
37 contd./ 
debt within 3 months from cash on hand and ordinary 
collection of receivables; the notes to its certified bal-
ance sheets for the years 1939, 1940 and 1941, that the 
accounts in its Receivables Division had a high degree of 
liquidity and that the average days to maturity was within 
60 days; the statement in its 1943 report that the company 
had demonstrated the liquidity of its receivable portfolio 
over a period of years; the statements in its 1944 and 
1945 reports that its balance sheets continued to reflect 
a satisfactory liquid position; and the statements in the 
1946 report that the company's program for 1947 was to in-
crease its accounts receivable business, reduce its inven-
tory financing, and increase the liquidity of its assets 
so that in a short time it would be in the same liquid con-
dition it enjoyed prior to the war. 
38/ This reference to getting the accounts "back" to ordinary 
accounts receivable is a recognition that Seaboard was not 
by choice and typically in the business of rehabilitating 
companies in dire financial condition, as are the above 
noted statements in prior years in Seaboard's reports and 
financial statements which were audited by TN's predecessor 
firm. 
39/ Accounting Research Bulletin No. 30 recognizes that the 
working capital of a borrower has always been of prime in-
terest to grantors of credit, and states that the tendency 
is for creditors to rely upon the ability of debtors to 
pay their obligations out of the proceeds of current oper-
ations. It describes an operating cycle as the average 
time intervening between the acquisition of materials or 
services, their sale and conversion into receivables, and 
the final cash realization. This operating cycle concept 
(Continued) 
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Advances to Coastal 
The Staff has contended, and the hearing examiner has 
found, that all of Coastal's indebtedness to Seaboard of 
$6l8,535 should have been transferred to non-current assets 
and that the transfer of only $318,535 of that amount did not 
conform to good accounting practice. Respondents take the 
position that the latter figure was determined in accordance 
with the provision of Rule 5-02-7 of our Regulation S-X 40/ 
that indebtedness of a subsidiary shall not be considered as 
current unless its net current asset position Justifies such 
treatment. They contend that since Coastal's balance sheet 
as of December 31, 1947, listed current assets which ex-
ceeded current liabilities to others than Seaboard by about 
$334,000, they were justified in treating the lower amount 
of $300,000 of advances to Coastal as current. 
Good accounting practice does not permit classification 
as current assets of advances to a subsidiary, even if it has 
sufficient net current assets to cover the advances, unless 
it is the intention or practice of the subsidiary to currently 
liquidate the indebtedness. 41/ TN's own Guide to Report 
Wrting, dated December 1, 1947, states that indebtedness of a 
subsidiary may be included in current assets to the extent 
that its margin of net current assets justifies such treat-
ment, "though preferably only if it is the practice of the sub-
sidiary to liquidate the account periodically or if we have 
reasonable assurance that the account can be liquidated at 
an early date." 42/ By this test the entire $6l8,535 of 
advances to Coastal should have been transferred to non-
current assets since the facts available with respect to 
Coastal's history of losses and increasing indebtedness made 
it unreasonable to expect that Coastal's operations would pro-
vide any significant funds out of earnings to make current 
payments on Seaboard's advances. 
39 contd./ 
in the case of Seaboard obviously makes sense only in 
relation to the businesses of the underlying companies, 
and those businesses under normal operations had a cycle 
of not more than one year. The fact they were unable to 
operate successfully and profitably cannot be used to 
extend the cycle and make current assets out of frozen 
or hopeless accounts. 
40/ Regulation S-X, promulgated by us under the various Acts 
administered by us, specifies generally the form and con-
tent of financial statements required to be filed under 
such Acts. 
41/ Cf. Montgomery's Auditing (7th Ed., 1949), page 169. 
42/ Accounting Research Bulletin No. 30, cited by respondents 
in support of their application of the business cycle con-
cept to Seaboard, also states that there should be ex-
cluded from the current classification receivables arising 
from unusual transactions, such as advances to affiliates 
which are not expected to be collected within twelve 
months. 
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Moreover, if the narrow view were accepted that Rule 
5-02-7 justifies classifying as current assets advances to a 
subsidiary merely on a showing that the subsidiary's net 
current asset position covers such advances, Seaboard's bal-
ance sheet still overstated the amount of current advances to 
Coastal. Coastal's balance sheet did not classify as a current 
liability a reserve of $142,968 with respect to a government 
claim against it under the Renegotiation Act. 43/ Generally 
accepted accounting principles require that such a reserve be 
classified as a current liability. 44/ If this reserve had 
been included, as it should have been, in Coastal's current 
liabilities, Coastal's net current asset position would have 
been reduced by that amount, thus necessitating a transfer to 
non-current assets on Seaboard's balance sheet of at least an 
additional $109,000. 
Note to Financial Statement 
Note C to the current notes and accounts receivable 
shown in Seaboard's balance sheet as of December 31, 1947, 
which respondents stated was inserted at their request, re-
cited that 
"In accordance with generally recognized 
trade practices in the business in which the 
Corporation is engaged, notes and accounts 
receivable include items, a substantial but 
indeterminable amount of which may not be fully 
realizable within one year. Of the aggregate 
current and non-current receivables, approxi-
mately $3,158,894.93 represents items due from 
three customers." 
We find this Note to be inaccurate and misleading. 
There is evidence of a trade practice of finance companies 
under certain circumstances to include in current assets 
installment receivables which mature or become due more than 
one year after the balance sheet date. This practice is 
43/ See note p. 28, supra. 
44/ See American Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research 
Bulletin No. 21 (December 1943). 
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recognized in Regulation S-X 45/ and was referred to in notes 
to Seaboard's financial statements for the years 1934 through 
1946 as the basis for classifying as "current" in those years 
the entire amount of installment receivables and notes receiv-
able retail due after one year. 46/ However, there is no 
evidence of a trade practice to include in current assets 
receivables originally due within one year which had become 
stagnant due to deterioration in the financial condition of 
the debtors. Seaboard's major accounts at December 31, 1947 
were of the latter character and did not qualify for the 
treatment referred to in Note C. 
The Note was further misleading in implying that the 
items referred to might be realized within one year, when in 
fact this possibility was all but precluded by the continuing 
losses and precarious financial condition of the debtors. 
The last sentence of Note C indicates the great concentration 
of advances to three customers of over $3,000,000. Werntz in 
a draft of the Note had suggested there be added at its end 
the words "in which there appears to be no material equity 
capital." Certainly that would have been of the greatest 
interest to bank creditors, and the only suggested criticism 
of the proposed addition is that it would have been an under-
statement, 47/ Werntz' suggestion was not adopted and the 
statement about the lack of equity was omitted. 
45/ Rule 3-13 of Regulation S-X provides: 
"Items classed as current assets shall be generally 
realizable within one year. However, generally 
recognized trade practices may be followed with 
respect to the inclusion of items such as installment 
receivables or inventories long in process, provided 
an appropriate explanation of the circumstances is 
made and, if practicable, an estimate is given of the 
amount not realizable within one year." 
46/ The notes to Seaboard's prior statements were similar to 
notes appearing in the financial statements of a number 
of other commercial credit companies for 1947, all of 
which refer to inclusion in current assets of certain 
receivables due or which mature more than one year after 
the balance sheet date. 
47/ The three customers referred to in Note C were Amity, 
Bridgeport and Varet. The financial statements seen by 
respondents showed Amity to have a deficit of about 
$435,000 and Bridgeport a net worth of $645. Respondents 
saw no financial statements on Varet but Seaboard conceded 
(Continued) 
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Conclusions with Respect to Current Assets 
In conclusion, we find that the respondents, after 
thorough consideration of the problem, tentatively determined 
that Seaboard would have to transfer from current to non-
current assets about $1,350,000 of its advances to companies 
other than Coastal; that they receded from this position with-
out sound reason, and certified a balance sheet listing only 
$641,713 of such advances as non-current, an amount which was 
materially understated; that the $318,535 of advances to 
Coastal transferred to non-current was materially understated; 
and that Note C to the financial statements was inaccurate 
and misleading. 
Relationship of Underlying Companies to Seaboard 
The Staff has contended, and the hearing examiner has 
found, that Seaboard's balance sheet was also materially mis-
leading because amounts shown as due from "customers" erro-
neously included amounts due from subsidiaries. 
Under the applicable provisions of Regulation S-X, 
current amounts due from subsidiaries were required to be 
stated separately, and amounts due from a subsidiary were not 
to be considered as current unless the net current asset posi-
tion of the subsidiary justified such treatment. 48/ The 
instructions for preparation of the Form 10-K in effect at the 
time of the Seaboard audit defined a "subsidiary" of a person 
as "an affiliate controlled by such person directly or indirect-
ly through one or more intermediaries". "Affiliate" was de-
fined as "a person that directly, or indirectly through one or 
more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under 
common control with such person". And "control" was defined 
as "the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to 
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies 
of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, 
by contract or otherwise". 
Respondents state that they reasonably believed that the 
companies classified as customers were not subsidiaries because 
Seaboard did not treat these companies as subsidiaries in its 
records and respondents through past association had complete 
confidence in the Seaboard management. They assert that 
47 Continued/ 
that it might suffer a loss of $100,000 on the liquidation 
of the Varet inventory. 
48/ Regulation S-X, Rule 5-02, paragraph 7. 
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although Seaboard had instigated numerous changes in the 
managements of the "customers" and advanced the funds whereby-
new managements acquired interests in such companies, such 
actions were taken by Seaboard to protect its interests as 
the dominent creditor and do not raise any inferences of a 
subsidiary relationship. 
Respondents urge that an essential characteristic of 
a subsidiary relationship is the ownership of stock. But in 
at least two cases it appears that Seaboard did own the stock 
of companies classified as customers. One of these was Tampa-
New Orleans - Tampico Air Lines, Inc. ("Tampa") which re-
spondents admit was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Seaboard. 
Werntz testified that although he knew the Tampa stock was 
owned by Seaboard the amount Tampa owed Seaboard, about 
$15,000 at December 31, 1947, was so small that the subsidiary 
question did not come to mind when setting up the balance 
sheet. But the significance of the Tampa relationship went 
beyond that indebtedness. Seaboard had begun financing Tampa 
in January 1946 and shortly thereafter, following Tampa's 
default on the loan, acquired first a controlling interest 
in Tampa and then all of Tampa's stock. In December 1946 
the Tampa balances owing Seaboard were considered greater 
than could be collected and so were written down by 
$100,000. 49/ In 1947 an additional $389,250 was written 
off, making a total of $489,250 written off in the two years, 
and leaving as an amount due only about $15,000 believed to 
be collectible. Yet all this time Seaboard never classified 
the advances due from Tampa as due from a subsidiary. Re-
spondents should not have placed reliance on management's 
classification of the underlying companies, but should have 
made independent inquiry to ascertain whether subsidiary re-
lationships existed in other accounts. 
Seaboard also owned all the stock of Varet through the 
medium of Knitted Specialties, and the amounts due from both 
of these companies (an aggregate of $682,561) should also 
have been shown as due from subsidiaries. As noted, Varet 
was organized by Seaboard in November 1947 to take over Fair-
hue and Varet Knitting Mills. The Varet stock was held by a 
Seaboard nominee; Seaboard employees were elected officers 
and directors of Varet and took control of its office and 
affairs. On December 31, 1947, however, Seaboard sold the 
49/ One of TN's predecessor firms had audited Seaboard's 
1946 statements and Brown had been in charge of that audit. 
Tampa was not shown as a subsidiary in the 1946 statements. 
- 44 - A - 78 
Varet stock to Knitted Specialties, which it had formed for the 
purpose, lending the latter the money with which to acquire the 
stock and placing the Knitted Specialties stock in the name of 
one of its attorneys as nominee. 
Respondents knew the Varet stock had been acquired in 
November 1947 by a nominee of Seaboard, and therefore checked 
to ascertain the status of that stock at December 31. The 
check showed that as of that date the Varet stock had been 
acquired by Knitted Specialties, and that Seaboard had loaned 
Knitted Specialties the money for this purpose. Respondents 
state that they were thereby satisfied that the Varet stock 
was owned by another company and Varet was no longer a sub-
sidiary of Seaboard, and made no further inquiry as to the 
ownership of Knitted Specialties or the circumstances surround-
ing the transfer of the stock. They claim that if Varet was 
in fact a subsidiary this was concealed from them. However, 
in our opinion, respondents should have realized under all the 
circumstances that a question existed, and the failure of Sea-
board's counsel or others to mention the subject voluntarily 
was not sufficient excuse for not pursuing an independent 
inquiry. 50/ 
In addition to the Tampa and Varet situations, we also 
find that a parent-subsidiary relationship existed with 
certain of the other companies indebted to Seaboard, and that 
the amounts due from these companies should have been por-
trayed accordingly. 
As to three of the debtors, Amity, Bridgeport and 
Maddocks Potato Products, Inc. ("Maddocks"), although Seaboard 
was not the actual holder of stock all the surrounding circum-
stances suggested that in effect it was the real owner of 
their stock. But in any event, it held the power of control 
which under the definition of "subsidiary" in the Form 10-K 
instructions is the determinative factor and may exist in the 
absence of stock ownership. 51/ Respondents contend that 
50/ The confirmation request sent by respondents to Varet in 
the course of the audit was returned signed by one of Sea-
board's men as president of Varet; the indebtedness of 
Knitted Specialties was not confirmed and Blomquist's 
working papers noted that a second confirmation request 
was "held up". 
51/ TN's own Guide for Report Writing as of December 31, 1947, 
stated that control may exist otherwise than through stock 
ownership. 
- 45 - A - 78 
these companies were not rendered subsidiaries because of 
Seaboard's dominant creditor influence over them, and that it 
would impose an impossible burden upon accountants to require 
them to determine whether a company owning no stock in 
another company has control over that company by virtue of 
their business relations. However, the situation prevailing 
with respect to those companies as of December 31, 1947, and 
Seaboard's relationship with them was such that it was 
apparent that Seaboard had become more than a dominant 
creditor, but had, for all practical purposes, taken over 
these companies. 
As previously noted, Amity's operations were unsuccess-
ful, and in March 1947 a contract was entered into between 
Seaboard and Amity which declared Amity in default and gave 
Seaboard extremely broad powers of control over Amity's oper-
ations. Amity's stock originally was owned in equal amounts 
by William G. Church and Armand DeMott. Although the Amity 
stock appeared worthless, Seaboard bought the stock owned by 
Church and DeMott in order to secure it without the risk of 
bankruptcy proceedings. In September, 1947, Seaboard bought 
Church's half of the stock for $13,400, the unpaid balance of 
his indebtedness to Seaboard, and simultaneously sold the 
stock for $100 to Joseph R. Zelenka, then head of Seaboard's 
business advisory service and a Seaboard director. 52/ In 
December 1947, Seaboard advanced $30,000 to Amity to buy 
DeMott's stock; the shares, endorsed in blank, were turned 
over to Seaboard and retained by Seaboard until March 4, 1948, 
when they were delivered to Amity. Thus, as of December 31, 
1947, Seaboard, which had advanced more than $1,000,000 to 
Amity, was in possession of 50% of Amity's stock 53/ and the 
52/ Zelenka, who had been trying to work out the Amity account 
for Seaboard, resigned his Seaboard positions and was named 
president of Amity. 
53/ In a memorandum of December 18, 1947, Rose advised the Sea-
board directors that DeMott's stock had been acquired by 
Amity under an option to Seaboard. Respondents contend 
there is no reference to Rose's memorandum in Blomquist's 
working papers and that the inference is that it was not 
shown to him. However, Blomquist referred in his working 
papers to other portions of Rose's report to the board on 
that date. Furthermore, Werntz testified that the reports 
concerning the debtors presented at the directors' meet-
ings were available to TN. 
- 46 - A - 78 
other 50% was in the name of Seaboard's former employee, 
Zelenka, who had paid only $100 therefor. Zelenka did not 
exercise independent control over Amity's operations, and ob-
tained Babcock's approval with respect to a variety of 
matters, including for example a change in Amity's working 
hours. 
With respect to Bridgeport, its survival in the face 
of substantial losses through 1946 and 1947 depended upon 
continuous advances from Seaboard, which had reached a total 
of approximately $1,500,000 by December 31, 1947. In October 
1947, Seaboard organized a company named Stratford Corporation 
("Stratford"), and loaned it $49,200 to acquire Bridgeport's 
shares from its president, which shares were thereupon pledged 
with Seaboard as collateral for the loan. Thereafter, Sea-
board installed three persons in the management of Bridgeport 
and sold the Stratford shares to one of them for $10,000, 
which it lent him for that purpose on the security of his 
note collateralized by the Stratford shares. 
After the nominal owner of the Stratford shares became 
ill in December 1947 and left Bridgeport, those shares were 
still held by Seaboard as collateral. In January 1948, Sea-
board sold 100 shares of Stratford stock each to the other 
two persons and to an employee of Seaboard's advisory service, 
and advanced them each $1,000 to acquire such shares. Sea-
board sold the remaining 700 shares to Stratford for $7,000, 
and the former owner's note was marked paid. 
There can be little doubt that at December 31, 1947, 
Seaboard controlled Bridgeport, its management and its 
policies. Substantially all of Bridgeport's assets and all 
of its stock and the stock of Stratford were pledged with 
Seaboard and no one had any money invested in Bridgeport 
except Seaboard. 
Maddocks was incorporated early in 1946 by H. Ross 
Maddocks for the purpose of manufacturing certain potato pro-
ducts. Advances were made by Seaboard both to Maddocks and 
to Mr. Maddocks, who acquired the stock of the new company 
and pledged it with Seaboard. The company, which apparently 
made no sales during 1946, sustained a net loss of $7,667 
for the seven months period ending December 31, 1946, and in 
1947, on sales of $2,333, sustained a net loss of $26,960. 
As of December 31, 1947, Maddocks, with current assets of 
only $8,581, had an earned surplus deficit of $34,64l, and 
it and Mr. Maddocks owed Seaboard a total of approximately 
$94,000. 
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Under a contract entered into in April 1946 Seaboard, 
among other things, was given the right to name all officers 
and directors of Maddocks, except that Mr. Maddocks was to be 
the president and one of the directors, and Seaboard was given 
an option to purchase the former's stock if he desired to 
dispose of it or died and the right to purchase any additional 
stock issued in the future. 
The respondents contend that there is no evidence that 
the April 1946 contract was in any of the Seaboard files given 
to Blomquist for examination, and that, since there is no 
reference to it in his working papers, the reasonable inference 
is that he never saw the document. However, the facts which 
clearly were known to the respondents should at least have 
caused them to make some inquiry as to the possible existence 
of a parent-subsidiary relationship between Seaboard and 
Maddocks, and such inquiry, if diligently pursued, would have 
revealed the existence of such a relationship in fact. 54/ 
The situation with respect to Ripley and Technical 
similarly indicated that Seaboard possessed the power to 
direct their management and policies. 
Seaboard's pervasive interest in and control of all 
seven of the companies discussed above was such a crucial 
factor in any presentation of Seaboard's financial condition 
as of December 31, 1947, that even if there had been a reason-
able doubt whether such companies should properly be listed 
as subsidiaries, at the least some other appropriate dis-
closure of the situation was required. 55/ 
54/ Among the facts which were known to the respondents was 
that Maddocks' books and records were kept at Seaboard's 
offices and that the confirmation request was signed by 
Burns, Seaboard's treasurer, as treasurer of Maddocks. 
55/ We have already noted in connection with the discussion of 
the reserve question that respondents did propose the in-
clusion in their certificate of a paragraph intended to 
describe the nature of the companies then indebted to Sea-
board; this paragraph, however, was deleted at manage-
ment's request. In this connection it should be noted 
that the definition of control in the Form 10-K in-
structions included the following: "If in any instance 
the existence of control is open to reasonable doubt, the 
registrant may state the material facts pertinent to the 
possible existence of control, with a disclaimer of any 
admission of the actual existence of effective control." 
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Respondents' Responsibilities 
Respondents assert that their 1947 report very clearly 
pointed out that Seaboard was in difficult straits and that 
its financial condition had seriously deteriorated in 1947, 
citing that respondents had insisted on the substantial in-
crease in the reserve, the substantial advances excluded from 
current assets, and the note regarding the large advances to 
three companies. They contend that a charge of lack of inde-
pendence cannot be justified in face of the fact that TN re-
fused to certify the statements in the form desired by manage-
ment and insisted on the significant changes mentioned above 
before an unqualified certificate was given. 
Respondents did make suggestions that very substantial 
amounts be added to the reserve for losses and excluded from 
current assets, that the certificate include a paragraph in-
tended to reflect the conditions of Seaboard's accounts, and 
that a note be added regarding the concentration of advances 
to three companies. But the results finally shown in the fi-
nancial statements and the accompanying certificate fell far 
short of the initial recommendations; and the financial state-
ments and the certificate as a whole minimized and even nulli-
fied to a certain extent the unfavorable disclosures that were 
made. 56/ 
The basic deficiency of the financial statements was 
that they did not portray realistically the financial affairs 
of Seaboard. 57/ No one reading such statements and TN's 
56/ For example, while the increase of $750,000 in the reserve 
for losses, though inadequate, was substantial, the re-
lated notes sought to soothe feelings of concern this in-
crease might have occasioned by stating that ail accounts 
considered doubtful were already written off and that if 
any part of the reserve was deducted from the related ad-
vances assets would be understated, and by implying that 
the reserve increase was provided as an extra precaution 
against possible future losses that might result from 
general business conditions. 
57/ Cf. Associated Gas and Electric Company, 11 S.E.C. 975, 
at 1058 (1942): 
". . .We should have hesitated to criticize the 
accountants on individual items had we not been 
unequivocally satisfied that the financial 
(Continued) 
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certification would have understood that Seaboard's major 
accounts in general were losing money and in default on their 
obligations to Seaboard; that advances carried as current 
assets not realizable within one year included substantial 
amounts on which the debtors were in default and which could 
not be expected to be paid within one year because of the 
deteriorated condition of such debtors; that three principal 
debtors which together owed Seaboard more than $3,000,000 
(Amity, Bridgeport and Varet) had no equity and were in de-
fault, and that Seaboard had foreclosed on one and instituted 
management changes in the other two under circumstances which 
clearly demonstrated Seaboard had taken over control; and 
that substantial amounts shown as income represented service 
charges and interest due from debtors which were not able to 
pay, and had not been paying, any interest or service charges 
except through additional advances from Seaboard. It seems 
clear that the efforts of the Seaboard management were di-
rected to the objective of concealing and minimizing the true 
unfavorable condition of the company and that respondents were 
swayed by the wishes of the management and their certificate 
did not prevent the accomplishment of the management's 
purpose. 58/ 
57 contd./ 
statements, looked at as a whole, were not truth-
fully informative and should never have been 
certified. 
"We think, moreover, that too much attention to 
the question whether the financial statements 
formally complied with principles, practices and 
conventions accepted at the time should not be 
permitted to blind us to the basic question 
whether the final statements performed their 
function of enlightenment, which is their only 
reason for existence." 
58/ There is no evidence that respondents profited financially 
or otherwise by handling the audit as they did. However, 
it would seem that accountants rarely do benefit from a 
failure to perform their functions properly. See 
Kostelanetz, "Accountants' Responsibilities and the Crimi-
nal Law," The New York Certified Public Accountant (July 
1943), P. 401: 
"It must be observed that derelictions by 
accountants are for the most part not a result of 
(Continued) 
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Respondents assert that the certified financial state-
ments were adequate to put Seaboard's bank creditors on notice 
as to the deteriorated condition of Seaboard and resulted in 
the banks taking immediate action, so that by September 1948, 
within six months after the delivery of those statements to 
the banks, Seaboard was in liquidation. However, a public 
accountant whose duty it is to convey full Information does 
not fulfill his obligations by simply giving so much infor-
mation as is calculated to induce requests for more. 59/ 
Although when they saw the financial statements the banks were 
sufficiently concerned to ask Seaboard for supplementary in-
formation, it was not until this supplementary Information, 
which was substantially the same as that furnished respondents 
by Seaboard in the course of the audit, was furnished to the 
banks that they really became alarmed and instituted inquiries 
and surveys independent of the management. 60/ 
58 contd./ 
greed to share in the loot produced by fraud. On 
the contrary, accountants have been led astray by 
their desire to help their clients out of a particular 
embarrassment by stretching a point of auditing or 
accounting principle. Unless the affairs of the client 
improve, the accountants subsequently find themselves 
committed to the same intentional errors but to a 
greater degree, until a day of reckoning when third 
parties, usually creditors, stockholders, or the govern-
ment, delve into the affairs of the client and discover 
the fraud • . . almost invariably the facts show that 
except for the retention of a particular client of doubt-
ful value accountants have not profited by the schemes, 
• • • 
59/ Associated Gas and Electric Company, 11 S.E.C. 975, 1058 
(1942; Cf. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 6 S.E.C. 
268, 277 (1939); Universal Camera Corporation, 19 S.E.C. 
648, 654 (1945). — — 
60/ The banks had Seaboard employ TN to make a survey of the 
principal debtors of Seaboard as of June 30, 1948, "en-
tirely independent of what Mr. Babcock and his immediate 
associates at the head office may have to say about the 
several situations." 
(Continued) 
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The responsibility of a public accountant is not only 
to the client who pays his fee, but also to investors, 
creditors and others who may rely on the financial statements 
which he certifies. The function of an independent public 
accountant has been described as follows by the executive 
director of the American Institute of Accountants: 
" . . . Whenever he certifies a financial state-
ment the certified public accountant is potentially, 
at least, rendering a service to two or more parties 
whose interests may come into conflict — management 
and stockholder, borrower and lender, purchaser and 
seller. He may, and often does, serve simultaneously 
competitors in the same line of business, without 
fear on the part of either client that he will favor 
the one of the other. It is the peculiar obligation 
of the certified public accountant, which no other 
profession has to impose on its members, to maintain 
a wholly objective and impartial attitude toward the 
affairs of the client whose financial statements he 
certifies. The certified public accountant ac-
knowledges a moral responsibility (and under the 
Securities Act this is made a legal and financial 
responsibility) to be as mindful of the interests 
60 contd./ 
TN's survey, completed about July 15, 1948, showed that 
Seaboard's advances increased substantially by June 30, 
1948, that the debtors' conditions were precarious, and 
that as of June 30, 1948 an estimated reserve for losses 
of $2,500,000 was required if efforts were made to work 
out the situations over a period of one to three years 
and of $4,150,000 if liquidation proceedings were initiated 
immediately. This was so disturbing that the banks en-
gaged two men experienced in the commercial credit field 
to take a quick look at Seaboard's operations. The banks 
also had Seaboard engage a new general manager selected 
by them, had an engineering survey made by industrial 
engineers, and an audit by the public accounting firm of 
S. D. Leidesdorf & Co. as of July 31, 1948. The banks 
also had questions as to adequacy of the financial state-
ments certified by TN as of December 31, 1947, and engaged 
S. D. Leidesdorf & Co. to review the Seaboard books and 
records which would have been available to accountants 
making an audit as of December 31, 1947. Following all 
this Seaboard's accounts, with the exception of Ripley, 
were liquidated with very substantial losses. 
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of strangers who may rely on his opinion as of 
the interests of the client who pays his fee. 
This is at the same time a heavy burden and a 
proud distinction. It marks the certified public 
accountant as an individual of the highest in-
tegrity; a tough-minded technician whose judgment 
cannot be unbalanced by the strongest pressures, 
who stakes a hardearned professional reputation 
on his ability to express a fair and just opinion 
on which all concerned may rely; in the broad 
sense, a highly useful servant to society as a 
whole. 
" . . . The certified public accountant, therefore, 
in providing accounting statements which all con-
cerned may accept as disinterested expressions, 
based on technically sound procedures and ex-
perienced judgment, may serve as a kind of arbiter, 
interpreter, and umpire among all the varied in-
terests. Thereby he can eliminate the necessity 
for costly separate investigations by each party 
at interest, as well as endless doubts, delays, 
misunderstandings, and controversies which are so 
much sand in the economic machine." 61/ 
The public accountant must report fairly on the facts 
as he finds them whether favorable or unfavorable to his 
client. 62/ His duty is to safeguard the public interest, 
61/ John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Public Accounting 
(1946), pp. 13-l4. 
62/ See e.g. The Journal of Accountancy, December 1946, p. 453: 
"Technical accounting ability is essential 
for success in the field of public accountancy, but 
it is the quality of a certified public accountant's 
integrity and his independence more than his ability 
that determine the extent of his usefulness to 
society. No matter how highly skilled a certified 
public accountant might be, if he could not be de-
pended upon to see that the financial statements 
which he certifies are honestly presented, whether 
his client likes it or not, he would be not only 
valueless in the public accounting profession, he 
would be a business menace. But a public accountant 
of only ordinary technical accounting ability, whose 
(Continued) 
- 53 - A - 78 
not that of his client. As this Commission pointed out In the 
Matter of Cornucopia Gold Mines; 63/ 
" . . . The insistence of the Act [Securities Act 
of 1933] on a certification by an 'independent' 
accountant signifies the real function which 
certification should perform. That function is 
the submission to an independent and impartial 
mind of the accounting practices and policies of 
registrants. The history of finance well 
illustrates the importance and need for sub-
mission to such impartial persons of the account-
ing practices and policies of the management to 
the end that present and prospective security 
holders will be protected against unsound account-
ing practices and procedures and will be afforded, 
as nearly as accounting conventions will permit, 
the truth about the financial condition of the 
enterprise which issues the securities. Accord-
ingly, the certification gives a minimum of pro-
tection against untruths and half-truths which 
otherwise would more easily creep into financial 
statements . . . . It [the certificate] is a ma-
terial fact, for it gives meaning and reliability 
to financial data and makes less likely misleading 
or untrue financial statements . . . " 
Conclusions 
We have found that the Seaboard balance sheet as of De-
cember 31, 1947 was materially misleading in that an inadequate 
reserve was reflected therein for accounts known to be doubt-
ful of collection, current assets were overstated, advances 
to subsidiaries were not so designated, and the notes relating 
62 contd./ 
integrity and courage are unassailable, may be a 
tower of strength in his business community." 
(Address by Carman G. Blough. Underscoring 
supplied.) 
6 3 / 1 S.E.C. 364, 367 (1936). 
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to the reserve for losses and to current assets improperly 
described the nature of the reserve and the basis for in-
clusion of advances in current assets; and that Seaboard's 
income statement for the year 1947 was materially misleading, 
particularly in that insufficient provision was made for 
losses on uncollectible accounts. 
We have also found that in certifying such financial 
statements the respondents failed to comply with generally 
accepted auditing standards and rules and regulations of the 
Commission, and failed to fulfill their responsibilities as 
independent accountants by their reliance upon the unsupported 
and questionable representations of the Seaboard management in 
agreeing to accept a reserve figure which was materially in-
adequate and was substantially less than that which they had 
recommended; by agreeing to the transfer to non-current assets 
of advances in an inadequate amount substantially lower than 
they had recommended, without any proper basis therefor; by 
their failure to insist upon the proper classification of ad-
vances to subsidiaries on the Seaboard balance sheet; by their 
failure to insist upon the Seaboard income account being 
charged with an adequate provision for losses on uncollectible 
accounts; and by their agreeing, at the insistence of manage-
ment, to the deletion from their final certificate and from a 
note to the financial statements of a paragraph regarding the 
financial situation of the debtors at December 31, 1947. 
Under these circumstances we conclude that the TN firm 
and the individual respondents now before us, Mendes and 
Werntz, engaged in improper professional conduct within the 
meaning of Rule II(e). 64/ We accordingly turn to the question 
of what disciplinary action is appropriate. 
Respondents assert that the TN firm has earned the con-
fidence of the business and banking community by its demon-
strated ability and honesty and has a large number of important 
clients; that the individuals involved all have eminent back-
grounds and that the Seaboard audit is only a very small part 
of their professional careers of many years in which they have 
demonstrated their integrity; that the Seaboard audit involved 
difficult problems of judgment which had to be resolved 
64/ The Seaboard certificate was signed in the TN firm name. 
We have held that where a firm of public accountants permits 
a report or certificate to be executed in its name it will 
be held responsible therefor. Accounting Series Releases 
Nos. 67 and 68 (1949). 
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promptly; and that the respondents did insist on substantial 
changes in the statements and refused to issue an unqualified 
certificate unless such changes were made. 
They also point to the lapse of time since the audit 
was made, and note that the death prior to this proceeding of 
Brown, who it is asserted was the partner in charge and pri-
marily responsible for the conduct of the Seaboard audit, 
shifted the burden of defending his conduct or explaining the 
reasons for his decisions to the other individuals. Re-
spondents state that Carol F. Hall, who did take an active 
part in the discussions with Seaboard, did not undertake to 
re-examine all the audit work done by Brown but only to lend 
the benefit of his senior judgment. 65/ They also point 
out that Mendes, then the managing partner in TN's New York 
office, took only a small part in the Seaboard audit, and 
retired from active practice in 1952 after a long career. 
With respect to Werntz, respondents refer to the fact that 
he had joined one of the TN predecessor firms in 1947 after 
a career of teaching and service with this Commission and had 
no experience in public accounting prior to the Seaboard audit, 
and that in view of these facts and since Werntz was at the 
time an employee and not a partner, Brown as the partner in 
charge had the overriding responsibility and Werntz did not 
make the decisions. 6 6 / Werntz was reassigned to an out-of-
town engagement and did not attend the conferences after 
March 12, 1948, and respondents state that the final reserve 
figure represented the judgment of Brown and Hall and that 
some of the other questions developed and were settled while 
Werntz was away. 
Finally respondents urge that the present TN firm was 
in its infancy in 1947, that of its 49 present active partners, 
25 were not partners at the time of the Seaboard audit, and 
that any disqualification of the firm would impinge unfairly 
on them. 
We recognize that Brown, and to a lesser degree Hall, 
had the more active responsibility for the decisions made in 
the course of the audit and that Werntz made a number of 
65/ As previously noted Hall, who has since died, was origi-
nally named as a respondent. He testified in the hearings. 
66/ Werntz, who became a partner in 1950, is presently the 
managing partner of the TN New York office. 
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3uggestions which were not ultimately followed and did not 
participate in all the conferences. Nevertheless Werntz, who 
expected in due course to be and was subsequently admitted to 
partnership, participated most actively in the audit and con-
ferences through March 12; in his testimony he has associated 
himself with the audit procedures and the decisions regarding 
the reserve for losses and has vigorously defended them. 
Mendes as the senior partner in the New York office was re-
sponsible for the review of the certificate issued in the 
name of the firm and of the financial statements to which such 
certificate related; he was specifically consulted with re-
spect to the Seaboard situation, and attended at least one 
conference with management. He was aware of the serious 
problems that existed, and if in fact he was as unfamiliar 
with some of the circumstances as his testimony indicates, he 
failed to give the matter the attention it required. 
After careful consideration of all pertinent factors, 
including those stressed by respondents, we are of the 
opinion that respondents Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, Henry 
E. Mendes and William W. Werntz should be denied the privilege 
of practicing before this Commission for a period of 15 days. 
Rulings on Exceptions 
During the course of the hearings, exceptions were 
taken by the respondents to rulings of the hearing examiner 
admitting certain testimony and exhibits. The matter ob-
jected to related for the most part to events occurring prior 
to March 19, 1948, the date of certification, but which the 
respondents claimed to have been neither known to nor obtain-
able by them, and to events occurring subsequent to that date. 
We agree with respondents' position that their conduct should 
be judged in the light of the facts known or reasonably avail-
able at the time of their audit and in arriving at our con-
clusions on the issues, we have limited ourselves to such 
facts. To the extent that we have referred herein to events 
that took place after March 19, 1948, such reference has been 
only for informational purposes, or where appropriate as a 
comment on respondents' own references to subsequent events. 
On the basis of a careful examination of the evidence 
involved and the rulings of the hearing examiner, we are of 
the opinion that such rulings were correct, except in a few 
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minor instances not resulting in any prejudice to re-
spondents. 67/ 
With respect to exceptions taken to the recommended 
decision, to whatever extent such exceptions involve issues 
which are relevant and material to the decision in this case, 
we have by our opinion herein already fully ruled upon them. 
We hereby expressly sustain those exceptions to the extent 
that they are in accord with the views set forth herein, and 
we expressly overrule those exceptions to the extent that they 
are inconsistent with such views. 
An appropriate order will enter. 
By the Commission (Chairman Armstrong and Commissioners 
Orrick, Patterson, Hastings, and Sargent). 
Orval L. DuBois 
Secretary 
67/ Certain documents and testimony relating to specific events 
occurring subsequent to the date of certification which the 
respondents could not have known or foreseen, such as a 
letter from Zelenka to Babcock in April, 1948 which in 
effect tenders his resignation as president of Amity, should 
not have been admitted into evidence, and we have not relied 
on such material in reaching our decision. 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
before the 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
March 25, 1957 
In the Matter of 
TOUCHE, NIVEN, BAILEY & SMART 
a partnership 
233 Broadway 
New York 7, New York 
and 
HENRY EUGENE MENDES 
CAROL H. HALL 
WILLIAM W. WERNTZ 
OSCAR BLOMQUIST 
(Pile No. 4-77) 
(Rule II (e) - Rules of Practice) 
ORDER 
TEMPORARILY 
DENYING 
PRIVILEGE OP 
PRACTICING 
BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION 
A proceeding having been instituted pursuant to Rule 
II(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice to determine 
whether Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, a firm of certified 
public accountants, and Henry E. Mendes, Carol P. Hall, 
William W. Werntz, and Oscar Blomquist, presently or formerly 
partners or employees of said firm, should be disqualified or 
denied, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing 
or practicing before the Commission; 
A private hearing having been held after appropriate 
notice, the hearing officer having filed a recommended de-
cision, and a brief having been filed and oral argument heard; 
It appearing that Carol F. Hall died subsequent to the 
institution of the proceeding; and 
The Commission having this day issued its Findings and 
Opinion, on the basis of said Findings and Opinion 
IT IS ORDERED,pursuant to Rule II(e) of the Rules of 
Practice, that Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, Henry E. Mendes 
and William W. Werntz be denied the privilege of practicing 
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before the Commission for a period of 15 days, beginning 
May 1, 1957. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the proceeding be discon-
tinued as to Carol F. Hall, and be dismissed as to Oscar 
Blomquist. 
By the Commission. 
Orval L. DuBois 
Secretary 
